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ABSTRACT 
 
Economic Analysis of the Meat Supply Chain. (May 2008) 
Moon-Soo Park, B.S., Chonnam National University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. H. Alan Love 
                                                                                      Dr. Yanhong H. Jin 
 
Recently, the meat supply chain has undergone a number of structural changes including 
increased concentration and a greater degree of quasi-vertical integration coordinated 
through contract procurement. The effects these changes have had on the meat supply 
chain, arranged as a complex array of producers, processors, distributors, and retailers, 
are not yet known. This study investigates the motives for, and consequences of, recent 
changes in the meat supply chain. 
  The first essay examines causality among variables in the U.S. cattle supply 
chain using temporal and contemporaneous causality methodologies. Tests for structural 
changes reveal a likely structural change between later 1996 and early 1997 that was 
likely induced by the turnaround of the U.S. cattle inventory accompanied with severe 
droughts in Midwest. Results suggest that overall temporal causalities in the U.S. cattle 
supply chain become weaker after the structural change, though relatively strong 
causalities are found in pre-break periods. In contrast, strong contemporaneous causal 
relationships are founded in post-break periods. One conclusion is that recent structural 
changes in the industry are resulting in more rapid transmission of information through 
the supply chain. Causal evidence also suggests that the direction of information 
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transmission has changed in recent times from moving generally downstream to moving 
generally upstream. This might be the result of increased concentration at the packer and 
retail levels giving rise to increased ability to “set” prices. 
The second essay develops a theoretical model to investigate the dynamic effects 
of the contract procurement on packer competition in the spot market with general 
contract pricing scheme. Results indicate that packers have an incentive to consider the 
effects of spot market purchases on contract procurement even after accounting for 
hedonic characteristics of live cattle and risk aversion in cattle feeding operations. 
The third essay investigates the impacts of domestic and overseas animal disease 
outbreaks on the Korean meat supply chain. Market impacts are investigated using both 
forecasts and historical decomposition of price innovations based on an error correction 
model (ECM) of the Korean meat sector. Results indicate that while the affected markets 
suffered significantly from the outbreaks, the impacts seem temporary and substitute 
meat markets benefited significantly. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 
In this study, we examine the meat supply chain of two different markets including the 
U.S cattle supply chain and the Korean meat supply chain. Although geographically 
separated and distinguished by economic size, the fundamental market structures of both 
are similar and also they are vulnerable to similar external factors.  Today’s meat supply 
chain faces growing challenges—increasing operational complexity, new government 
regulations, consolidation within the industry, and food safety issues. Addressing how 
these issues are affecting the meat supply chain is important to market participants and 
may provide insights in to similar sectors elsewhere in the economy. 
As an important value-generating industry, the transformation of U.S. cattle supply 
chain has enormous impacts on the U.S economy, especially on the food industry. In 
particular, concentration and consolidation through quasi-vertical integration has been a 
basic characteristic that has affected structural changes taking place in each stage of 
marketing and production through the supply chain. Consolidation allows increasing 
market efficiency as well as reducing transaction cost. However, it may facilitate market 
power exertion which can reduce market competitiveness. In the U.S. beef supply chain, 
quasi-vertical integration through the use of captive supply has raised concerns among 
livestock producers. Although the relationship between captive supply and fed cattle 
price has received considerable attention in previous studies, the causal relationships 
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among prices and other variables reflecting market structure throughout the supply chain 
has barely received attention. Therefore, causal relationships among variables in U.S. 
cattle supply chain should be addressed. Understanding causal linkages among different 
segments of the U.S. cattle supply chain has rich policy implications for both regulators 
and economic participants in the supply chain. 
Increasing use of captive supply contracts has made it difficult for fed cattle 
producers to understand contract prices and increasingly there is concern about the 
efficiency of price signals emerging from the spot market. Beef packers are rapidly 
switching from traditional spot procurement in fed cattle markets to contract 
procurement using contracts containing Top-of-the-Market-Pricing (TOMP) clauses 
where the base contract price is set it at the highest spot price. Possible reasons to use 
contracts in fed cattle market procurement are to manage risk and to improve quality. 
However, contract procurement may reduce competition in the fed cattle spot market, 
potentially leading to increased market power for packers. In practice, contract prices 
reflect both observed and unobserved hedonic characteristics of fed cattle and stochastic 
market related influences. Therefore, contract prices could deviate from the spot market 
prices. This complicates uncovering the effect of TOMP clauses on spot market price. 
Another complicating factor is that packers repeatedly interact with each other both 
over time and across feedlots. Although there is no empirical evidence that meatpackers 
act as a collusive monopsony, packers may learn to coordinate their strategies in a 
dynamic setting and hence, compete less aggressively with each other in order to raise 
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their profit over the level that could be attained in a static or finite setting. Thus, a model 
based on one-shot game framework may produce distorted results. 
Concern of food safety due to animal disease has increased in all over the world 
since bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was discovered in UK in 1986. Animal 
disease outbreaks, especially those that could spread to humans, might alter the 
consumption pattern of the meat products as consumers lose confidence in food safety. 
Trade liberalization in recent years contributed to globalization of livestock industry. For 
example, the U.S., the largest producer of beef in the world, exports more than 10% of 
its beef production, with Japan, South Korea, Mexico, and Canada accounting for almost 
90% of the export value in 2003. As such, outbreaks of animal diseases such as bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), food-and-mouth disease (FMD), and avian influenza 
(AI) can have serious consequences for the livestock industry and the public health in 
both exporting and importing countries. In particular, Korea is import-dependent for its 
meat supply and traditionally has been one of the major export markets for U.S. beef, 
importing nearly 70% of its total beef consumption from the U.S. Therefore, animal 
disease outbreaks have been considered as a global public “good” emanating a negative 
externality that causes economic disruptions in the affected exporting country as well as 
importing countries. 
Most previous research aside from the cases of Europe and the U.S. mainly focuses 
on animal disease outbreaks in Japan (Jin et al., 2003; McCluskey et al., 2005; Peterson 
and Chen, 2005; Saghaian et al., 2007). Only few researches have examined the response 
  
4
 
of the Korean meat market to food scares and econometric studies concerning the impact 
of food scare in Korea are hardly found. 
Objective 1 
The first objective of this study is to investigate causal relationships among variables in 
the U.S. cattle supply chain to enhance understanding of the U.S. cattle sector. Previous 
work has focused on the impact of captive supplies on fed cattle cash market prices. We 
take a broad approach, investigating the relationships among prices and selective sector 
driving variables throughout the supply chain. In particular, both Granger causality tests 
for temporal causality and graph-theoretical analysis for contemporaneous causality are 
employed for investigating causality in U.S. cattle supply chain. Tests for structural 
changes are conducted to ensure reliability of model results. Causal relations will be 
estimated to determine how the relationships among prices and diving variables may 
have changes for the pre- and post- break periods.  
Objective 2 
The second objective is to develop a dynamic game theoretic framework to investigate 
the incentives for, and the dynamic effects of, contract and spot market cattle 
procurement by packers. The U.S. beef supply chain has experienced increasing 
concentration at both the packer and grocery retail levels and increasing use of contracts 
to coordinate transactions between tiers throughout the vertical structure. Based upon 
this industry background, a stage-game is set up and solved that allows relations between 
contract and spot market price to be investigated. The model captures the impacts of 
captive supply, hedonic characteristics of fed cattle, and risk aversion among cattle 
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producers. This applied theory model, while complex, should improve our understanding 
of how a number of complex factors interact to determine cattle prices. 
Objective 3 
The final objective is to investigate the impacts of animal disease outbreaks on the 
Korean meat market. Since the of turn of the century, the Korean meat market has been 
affected by three animal disease outbreaks: a FMD (Foot and Mouth Disease) outbreak 
in Korea in April 2000, an AI (Avian Influenza) outbreak in Korea in December 2003, 
and the first BSE discovery in the U.S. in December 2003. To identify and quantify the 
impacts of animal disease outbreaks on the Korean meat market we employ time series 
methods, mainly forecasting based on the error correction model (ECM) and historical 
decomposition of price innovations accompanied by directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) for 
contemporaneous causal ordering, to investigate in-depth the impacts of multiple disease 
outbreaks on prices of different meat types (beef, pork, chicken) at different levels of the 
marketing channel (retail, wholesale, and farm levels), price margin along the supply 
chain, and price interdependence in the meat system. 
Organization of the Study 
This dissertation will consist of three autonomous essays. Each essay is self-contained 
including introduction, methodology and conclusion, and addresses one of the three 
objectives. Chapter II contains an article title “Causality and Structural Changes in the 
U.S Cattle Supply Chain”. This chapter fulfills the goals described under the first 
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objective. Chapter III develops model to fulfill the goals the described in the second 
objective in an article titled “Contract Pricing and Packer Competition in Fed Cattle 
Market.” Chapter IV consists of an article titled “The Impacts of the Animal Disease 
Crises on the Korean Meat Market” as described in the third objective. Finally, Chapter 
V contains a collective discussion of the results and concluding comments. A cumulative 
set of reference and appendices follow Chapter V.  
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CHAPTER II 
CAUSALITY AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE U.S. 
CATTLE SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
The U.S. beef supply chain experienced a rapid transformation in recent years. The 
industry has become more concentrated at both the processor and retail levels. In 
addition, the beef processing industry is making increased use of contract production at 
the farm level (GIPSA 2002) and antidotal evidence suggests increased use of contracts 
to coordinate exchange between processors and retailers. Taken together, these changes 
suggest that the beef supply chain has become more tightly coordinated through 
contracts. Whether this has improved vertical coordination among the various tiers in the 
supply chain is an important but difficult issue to analyze. However, it is certainly the 
case that understanding causal linkages along the supply chain and how they might have 
changed through time has important implications for policy makers, for economic agents 
within supply chain, and for consumers. 
GIPSA defines captive supply as cattle owned or fed by packers or cattle procured 
from independent producers through forward contracts and marketing agreements so that 
cattle that are committed to a packer more than 14 days prior to slaughter (GIPSA 2002).  
The increasing use of captive supply along with high concentration among packers has 
raised concern about competitiveness and possible market manipulations by packers in 
spot market procurement (Love and Burton 1999; Xia and Sexton 2004). The 
relationship between captive supply and fed cattle spot price has received considerable 
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attention. Contract prices for fed cattle are based on cash price at the time of slaughter 
and producers believe that processors may use contracts to reduce volume on the cash 
market, thereby lowering both cash and contract price (Xia and Sexton, 2004). However, 
results from previous studies find that the relationship between captive supply and fed 
cattle spot prices are mixed (Schroeder et al., 1993; Parcell, Schroeder, and Dhuyvetter, 
1997; Ward, et al., 1998). Feuz et al. (2002) suggest that captive supply reduces 
transaction costs and market risk and, therefore, enhances efficiency and market 
competitiveness. Whereas, Conner et al. (2004) argue that captive supply may decrease 
fed cattle spot prices, soften competition, disfavor market access by small cattle 
producers, and increase market power of packers. However, previous studies do not say 
anything about causal direction between two variables even though the model may have 
a natural or implicit causal direction. The causal relationships among the U.S. beef 
supply chain remain as an important and challenging issue. 
In this article, we investigate causalities among variables in the U.S. beef supply 
chain. While previous work has focused on the impact of captive supplies on fed cattle 
cash market prices, we take a broad approach investigating relationships among prices 
and selective sector driving variables throughout the supply chain. Both Granger 
causality tests for temporal causality and graph-theoretical analysis for contemporaneous 
causality are employed. Causality tests based upon forecast performance or predictive 
ability are widely implemented by in-sample Granger causality tests. However, Ashley 
et al. (1980) suggest that following Granger (1969) causality tests should be based on 
out-of-sample testing. Ashley et al. (1980) state “. . . a sound and natural approach to 
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such [Granger causality] tests must rely on the out-of-sample forecasting performance of 
models relating the original series of interest.” There is an emerging literature 
advocating out-of-sample Granger causality tests (McCracken, 1999; Amato and 
Swanson, 2001; Clark and McCracken, 2001; Corradi and Swanson, 2002). Swanson 
and Granger (1997), who first introduce graphical methods into contemporaneous causal 
ordering of VAR models, argue that contemporaneous causal ordering can be 
complementary to Granger causality when there is temporal aggregation. Several studies 
employ DAGs to uncover the contemporaneous causal relations between innovations of 
VAR-type models (Bessler and Lee 2002). 
We also test for structural changes in the relationships among variables at different 
tiers of the supply chain and examine whether and how causalities change when a 
structural change occurs. Several events that may have changed relationships in the beef 
supply chain are of particular interest.  The 1996-1997 grain shock and the turnaround of 
the U.S. cattle cycle may affect cattle market structure (Mathews et al., 1999). The 
Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting (LMPR) Act of 1999 became effective on April 
2nd, 2001 and expired in October 1st, 2005.  The Act required meat packers to report both 
price and quantity information on all cattle purchased, including cattle purchased 
through contracts, to the Agricultural Marketing Services (AMS) of USDA (Njoroge et 
al., 2007). It mitigated what cattle producers perceived as packers’ unfair advantage of 
unilateral access to contract price information (Njoroge et al., 2007). The reported 
occurrences of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) infected cattle in the in US 
beef supply in December 2003 likely affected domestic beef demand and resulted in the 
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halting of US beef exports to many countries (Mattson and Koo, 2007). Our results show 
that the 1996 grain shock caused a significant structural change while the BSE discovery 
and the LMPR act had minor changes.  
The article is organized into five additional sections. The next section provides an 
overview of the U.S. beef supply chain and data descriptions. The section following 
describes the empirical methodology, including time-varying cointegration, out-of-
sample Granger causality tests, and directed acyclic graphs. The article then presents 
empirical results and provides conclusions and policy implications.  
Overview of the U.S. Beef Supply Chain and Data Description 
The U.S. beef supply chain is characterized by multiple production stages with rearing 
and weaning taking place in cow-calf operations sometimes including background 
operations, feeding to market weight by feedlots, slaughtering and fabricating by packers, 
and finally merchandising by retailers to consumers. This supply chain is illustrated in 
Figure 2.1. Cow-calf and background operations are first-stage producers providing 
feeder steers and heifers weighing more than 500 pounds. Feedlots (feeding operations) 
purchase feeder cattle from cow-calf operations and feed the animals with high-energy 
rations to finish them as fed cattle weighing approximately 1200 pounds. These fed 
cattle are purchased by beef packers. Beef packers slaughter and fabricate the finished 
fed cattle in their packing plants, and produce boxed (or wholesale) beef as their final 
output. Retailers including supermarkets, grocery stores, fast-food outlets, and 
restaurants are placed on the top of the supply chain. They sell beef to consumers. We 
use monthly data for nine variables representing different stages of the U.S. beef supply 
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chain. Data are from January 1988 to August 2005, and include captive supply, cattle 
inventory, feeder cattle prices, fed cattle spot prices, boxed beef prices, retail beef prices, 
fed cattle futures prices, corn prices, and the packer Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. All 
variables except captive supply and fed cattle futures prices are collected from the Red 
Meat Yearbook published by Economic Research Service (ERS) of USDA. 
Captive supply (CAPT), which is measured by the percentage of the total slaughter 
procured through long-term contracts by the four largest packing firms, is obtained from 
GIPSA. It is used to represent the degree of quasi-vertical integration in the cattle 
industry. Based on semi-annual cattle inventory data published by ERS in January and 
July we construct monthly cattle inventory (INVT) by subtracting monthly cattle 
slaughter from the previous cattle inventory and adding the monthly calf crop. Cattle 
inventory provides information on current and future beef production. Although the 
cyclical influence of cattle inventory is a primary factor determining beef supply that 
affects all the live cattle stages in the supply chain, it also has a large effect on overall 
cattle industry since the industry itself is cyclical in nature. We use feeder steer price 
(Oklahoma City, 750-800 lb, medium #1) to represent feeder cattle prices (FEEP), 
wholesale boxed beef cut-out value (Choice 1-3, Central U.S., 600-750 lbs) for boxed 
beef prices (BOXP), USDA all-fresh retail beef price from the Cattle Fax for retail beef 
prices (REBP), and Corn #2 Yellow, Central Illinois for feed corn prices (CORP). Fed 
cattle spot price (FEDP) is a weighted price index using a Tornquist index based on 
prices and quantities of steers and heifers (Choice 2-4, Nebraska, 1,100-1,300 lbs). Fed 
cattle constitute a major input to the packer’s production process, accounting for the 
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most of the production costs. Fed cattle futures prices (FUTP) traded in Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME) are obtained from the DataStream, an electronic database 
system providing historical financial data sets. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 
calculated as the sum of the squared market shares of individual firms reported by 
GIPSA is used as a measure for market concentration. Industries with an HHI below 
1000 are classified as unconcentrated, between 1000 and 1800 moderately concentrated, 
and above 1800 highly concentrated. Figure 2.2 plots these nine variables during the 
study period (1988:1-2005:8). For the empirical analysis, we conduct logarithmic 
transformation of all the nine series. 
Econometric Methodologies 
Complementary tests for both temporal and contemporaneous causality are used to gain 
understanding of the U.S. beef supply chain. We conduct out-of-sample Granger 
causality tests for temporal causality and directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to uncover 
contemporaneous causality. Causal relationships in the U.S. beef supply chain may 
change if there is a structural change. Therefore, tests for structural change are warranted 
before applying causality tests. We employ time-varying cointegration methods to test 
for structural changes and then conduct causality tests before and after any structural 
change. The detailed discussions of these methodologies are provided the rest of this 
section.   
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Time-Varying Cointegration Methods to Test for Structural Changes 
Time-varying cointegration methods that assume parameters vary over time have been 
mainly employed in the financial economics literature (Rangivid and Sörenson, 2002; 
Brada et al., 2005; Yang, 2006). Based upon Johansen’s (1991) maximum likelihood 
estimation method we utilize both recursive and rolling time-varying cointegration 
methods.  
Let tX  denote a 1×p  random vector representing p non-stationary time series. The 
data generating process of  tX  can be written by a vector error correction model 
(VECM) when p time series are cointegrated: 
(2.1) ∑−
=
−− ++ΔΓ+Π=Δ
1
1
1
k
i
tititt XXX εμ   for t = 1, …, T,  
where Δ  is a first-order difference operator such that 1−−=Δ ttt XXX , 'αβ=Π  is a 
pp × coefficient matrix indicating long-run relationships among variables, and iΓ  is also 
a pp × coefficient matrix measuring the short-run effect of itX −Δ  on  tXΔ . The rank of 
Π  determines the cointegration rank, r. Equation (2.1) can be re-written in a matrix 
format,  
(2.2) tttt ZZZ εμαβ ++Γ+= 21'0   for t = 1, …, T,  
where tt XZ Δ=0 , 11 −= tt XZ , [ ]' 1' 12 ,..., +−− ΔΔ= kttt XXZ and [ ]11   ,......, −ΓΓ=Γ k . The 
maximum likelihood estimation of equation (2.2) consists of a reduced rank regression 
of tZ 0  on tZ1  conditional on tZ 2 . Let 
)(
0
n
tR  and 
)(
1
n
tR denote residuals from the regression 
of tZ 0  and tZ1  on tZ 2 , and 
)(n
tRε  denote the corresponding residual errors, where the 
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superscript n denotes number of observations used for the estimation. Hence, )(0
n
tR , 
)(
1
n
tR , 
and )(ntRε  are ( ) tnntnt ZMMZR 21)(22)(020)(0 −−= ,   ( ) tnntnt ZMMZR 21)(22)(121)(1 −−= , and 
( ) tnntnt ZMMR 21)(22)( 2)( −−= εε ε ,   
for t = 1, …, n, where  ∑
=
=
n
s
jtitij ZZM
1
'  and ∑
=
=
n
s
jttj ZM
1
'εε  (i, j = 0, 1, 2).  The remaining 
analysis is based on the following regression equation where the parameter Γ  vector has 
been filtered out: 
(2.3) )()(1
')(
0
n
t
n
t
n
t RRR εαβ +=   for  t = 1, …, n. 
Equation (2.3) is estimated using both rolling and recursive methods. Post estimation 
we use trace tests to determine the rank of the time-varying cointegration vectors. Both 
recursive and rolling estimations start with a base sample period 0n  for Tn ≤< 01 . Let’s 
consider an example of 60-month base sample ( )600 =n . The recursive estimates are 
obtained by adding one additional observation to each estimate. That is, the first 60 
observations are used to obtain the first trace test statistic; the first 61 observations are 
used for the next trace statistic, and so on, till the first T-1 observations are used to 
obtain the last trace statistic. In contrast, the rolling estimates use a constant rolling 
window size of 60-month observations.  The first 60 observations are used to obtain the 
first trace test statistic, the 2nd to the 61st observations are used to obtain the second trace 
statistic, and so on till the last observation is used. 
Based on equation (2.3), we obtain eigenvalues 1> n1ˆλ >…> npλˆ > 0 and 0ˆ 1 =+npλ , and 
eigenvectors )ˆ ...., ,ˆ(ˆ 1
n
p
nV νν=  that are the solutions for the eigenvalue systems:  
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(2.4) ( ) 0011001011 =− − nnnn SSSSλ , 
where ∑
=
=
n
s
n
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n
is
n
ij RRn
S
1
)'()(1  for i, j = 0, 1 is residual product matrices corrected for tZ 2  
based on each sub-sample. The eigenvalues of equation (2.4) are used to form tests for 
stability of parameter estimates (See Hansen and Johansen (1999) for details). We use 
the p-r smallest non-zero eigenvalues, n−λˆ = ( nr 1ˆ +λ ,…, npλˆ ) corresponding to non-
stationary relations to form trace tests for the rank of the time-varying cointegration 
vectors. Let rp−τ define the trace test statistics to test for the null hypothesis of rank r: 
(2.5) ∑
+=
− −−=−=
p
ri
n
iprrp nHHQ
1
)ˆ1ln()|(ln2 λτ , 
where the hypotheses pH  and  rH  imply there exists either no unit root or p-r unit roots 
and r cointegration rank, respectively. The null hypothesis of r cointegration rank is 
rejected at the 5% significance level if the value of the normalized trace statistic is 
greater than one. Since causal relationships in the U.S. cattle industry may change if 
there is any structural change, we conduct causality tests before and after the structural 
change. 
Modeling Causalities 
Causality that reflects asymmetric relations between two variables differs from 
correlation through the process of identification (Moneta, 2005). Although there is no 
unique definition of causality (see Moneta, 2005 for details), the identification problem 
must be solved before investigating causalities. There are two competing approaches to 
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resolve the identification problem, the deductive structuralist approach represented by 
Cowles Commission (Simon, 1953) and the inductive probabilistic approach embodied 
in Grangers’ causality tests (Granger, 1969) and Sim’s vector autoregression model 
(Sims, 1980).  
The Cowles Commission argues that causality is derived based on a priori economic 
theory. The inductive probabilistic approach regards economic theory as an unreliable 
source of causal relation and explores the possibility of inferring causes based on 
statistical properties of the data without a priori theory restriction. Expecting that the 
past and present values of tx  contribute to predicting ty , Granger (1969) defines tx  
Granger-causes ty  if and only if 
),,,|(),,,,,,|( 212121 Θ≠Θ −−−−−− KKK tttttttt yyyPxxyyyP , where Θ  is the information 
set. Granger causality may be the most influential approach to identify causality in 
economics. It is based on lag relations between observations and therefore has little to 
say about contemporaneous causation. 
Sims (1980) claims that the theoretical restrictions used by the Cowles Commission 
for the identification are not well-grounded and the structural equations are in principle 
not identifiable. VAR models proposed by Sims, however, also require model 
restrictions for policy interpretations because an estimated VAR model following a 
reduced form cannot be used to infer causal relations. In particular, innovations 
computed from reduced VAR models cannot be isolated since a particular innovation is 
in general correlated with other unorthogonalized innovations. Sims (1980) proposes 
Choleski factorization and incorporates it into VAR models (we call structural VAR 
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models) to identify the contemporaneous effects of economic shocks. But the Choleski 
factorization, which allows researchers to arbitrarily choose one case among various 
possible causal stories, has received severe criticisms. Demiralp and Hoover (2003) 
argue that the majority of the literature that uses structural VAR models to identify 
contemporaneous causal structure among variables is conceptually consistent with the 
Cowles methodology that derives such restrictions from economic theory or from a 
priori knowledge.  
To overcome the arbitrariness resulting from Choleski factorization in the Sims’ 
structural VAR model, we employ DAGs to uncover contemporaneous causality. 
Developed by Pearl (2000) and Spirtes et al (2000) DAGs utilize conditional 
probabilities and graph theory (Swanson and Granger, 1997; Bessler and Lee, 2002; and 
Demiralp and Hoover, 2003), which is consistent with the “inductive probabilistic 
approach” suggested by Granger.  
(a) Out-of-Sample Granger Causality Tests for Temporal Causality 
The majority of previous studies on Granger causality focuses on in-sample predictive 
tests and is mainly based on the standard in-sample F or Wald tests. However, in-sample 
Granger causality tests using all observations for forecasting, risk over-fitting the data. 
Over-fitting causes spurious prediction and biased test results. To overcome the over-
fitting problem, we follow Amato and Swanson (2001) and implement out-of-sample 
Granger causality tests.  
To implement out-of-sample Granger causality tests in a multivariate system, we 
first examine whether the inclusion of series jtX  facilitates obtaining a better prediction 
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of series itX (i = CAPT, INVT, FEEP, FEDP, BOXP, REBP, FUTP, CORP, HHI, but 
ji ≠ ) given other series. We construct two VECMs specifications based on equation 
(2.1): the unrestricted full model includes all nine variables, and the restricted models 
exclude one specific variable from the unrestricted full model. We rewrite equation (2.1) 
as:  
(2.6) ∑−
=
−− ++ΔΓ+Π=Δ
1
1
1
k
i
m
t
mm
it
m
i
m
t
mm
t XXX εμ  for t = 1,…,T, 
where m indicates the unrestricted (m = u) and restricted (m = r) models, utX  is a 9×1 
vector for the unrestricted model, rtX  is a 8×1 vector excluding jtX  for the restricted 
model, and mtε  is a multivariate iid sequence with mean zero and covariance matrix mΣ .   
The out-of-sample Granger causality test is conducted using a three-stage procedure 
with recursive estimation. In the first stage, the first R observations are used to 
forecast mRiX 1, + , the first R+1 observations are used to forecast
m
RiX 2, + , and so on until the 
first T-1 observations are used to forecast mTiX , . Consequently, we have a total of T - R 
one-step-ahead forecasts utiX ,ˆ  and 
r
tiX ,ˆ  for TRRt ,,2,1 L++=  based on the unrestricted 
and restricted models. In the second stage, we calculate the unrestricted forecast error 
( uitit
u
it XXe ˆ−= ) and the restricted forecast error ( rititrit XXe ˆ−= ), where itX  is the actual 
series. We say that jtX  Granger causes itX  if 
u
ite  is smaller than 
r
ite  or if the unrestricted 
full model including jtX  results in more accurate forecasts than the restricted model. In 
the final stage, we examine whether there exists a statistically significant difference 
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between the unrestricted and restricted models in terms of their predictive accuracy. 
Based on the mean squared forecasting errors criterion suggested by Amato and 
Swanson (2001), we employ the modified Diebold-Mariano (DM) test (Harvey et al., 
1997) for equal forecasting performance in which the null hypothesis is 
22
0 : rtutt eedH −= . The corresponding DM test statistic is 
(2.7) ( ) ddVDM 5.0)(ˆ −= , 
where d is the sample mean of td , )(ˆ dV  is the Newey–West heteroskedacity and 
autocorrelation consistent estimator of the sample variance of td . Since the distribution 
under the null hypothesis is nonstandard, we use the simulated critical value developed 
by Clark and McCracken (2001) for DM tests. 
The Granger causality test might be spoiled by temporal aggregation. Temporal 
aggregation occurs when the frequency of observations, i.e., sampling interval, usually 
differs from the natural frequency of the underlying time series. The presence of 
temporal aggregation may lead to misleading inference of Granger causality. In 
particular, Tiao (1999) summarized the distortion due to temporal aggregation as, “…the 
causality issue is muddled once the data are aggregated. The problem is that if the data 
are observed at intervals when the dynamics are not working properly, then we may not 
get any kind of causality.” In the spirit of Granger causality, the causal event is observed 
ahead of the effect when we assume the cause and effect are ordered in time and the 
sampling frequency is sufficient to discern the cause and the effect. There should be no 
contemporaneous relationship between the cause and effect if the sampling frequency is 
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observed at the natural frequency (Granger, 1988). In reality, however, it is rare to get a 
data set that have no or very small temporal aggregation bias with exception of high 
frequency financial data. Hence, contemporaneous causality observed under a particular 
time interval may result from temporal aggregation.1 Therefore, it is useful to link the 
concept of Granger causality at the natural frequency with contemporaneous causality 
for the time aggregated process (Swanson and Granger, 1997; Breitung and Swanson, 
2002).  
(b) Contemporaneous Causality Test Using DAGs  
DAGs are pictures using arrows and vertices (variables) to represent the 
contemporaneous causal flow among or between a set of variables based on observed 
correlation and partial correlations (Pearl, 2000). Mathematically, DAGs can be used to 
represent conditional independence as implied by the recursive product decomposition: 
(2.8)  Pr( 1v , 2v , 3v , ..., nv ) ∏
=
=
n
i
ii pav
1
)|Pr(                                                         
                         
where Pr is the probability of  vertices 1v , 2v , 3v , ... nv  and ipa is the realization of 
some subset of the variables that precede iv  in order ( 1v , 2v , 3v , ... nv ).  
In DAGs, searching for conditional independence and/or dependence is a starting 
point to examine the indecisive causal relationship among variables. Pearl (2000) 
proposes “d-separation” as a graphical characterization of conditional independence. 
Two variables are said to be d-separated if the information flow between them is blocked 
by a third variable. The notion of d-separation is more clearly conceptualized by “causal 
                                                 
1 Granger (1988) suggests that missing variable also can be a source of contemporaneous causality under 
time interval. However, it is hard to identify what missing variables exist. 
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chain,” “causal forks”, and “causal inverted forks.” A case of causal chain A → B → C 
(that is, A causes B and B causes C) suggests that A and C are dependent (d-connected) 
but A and C are independent (d-separated) conditional on B since B opens up the 
information flow between A and C.  In the case of causal forks, A ← B → C, A and C are 
dependent but A and C are independent conditional on B as a common cause. In the case 
of inverted forks, A → B ← C, A and C are independent since the information on A 
cannot pass through to C by B (i.e., collider), but A and C are dependent (d-connected) 
conditional on B. Two DAGs are distributionally equivalent if they are generated by 
same probability distribution and are independence equivalent if they have identical 
independence constraints.  
We use the greedy equivalent search (GES) algorithm to generate DAGs (Chickering, 
2002).2  The algorithm starts with an equivalence class with no dependencies among 
variables following the Bayesian scoring criterion of Schwarz loss:  
(2.9) ThGDP k ln
2
),ˆ|(ln D) (G, S −= θ ,      
where P is the probability distribution, θˆ  is the maximum-likelihood estimate of the 
unknown parameters, h is the number of  free parameters (not equal to zero) of DAG G, 
T is the number of observations, and D is the data available to researchers. The scoring 
criterion considers the trade-off between fit represented by ),ˆ|(ln kGDp θ  and 
parsimony modeled by the term .ln
2
Th  The GES algorithm suggests a move in the 
                                                 
2 GES algorithm has several advantages over PC algorithm as an alternative algorithm. GES Algorithm 
does not require as strong assumptions as PC Algorithm (Causal sufficiency, Markov condition, 
Faithfulness). Also an appropriate significance level is not required to GES algorithm. 
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direction that increases the Bayesian score the most until no such move increases the 
score. Formally, the GES algorithm is a two-phase stepwise search algorithm that 
consists of both forward equivalence class search for addition of single edges in the first 
phase and backward equivalence class search for deletion of single edges in the second 
phase. Through forward equivalence search for sequentially single edge additions, one 
equivalence class that has the highest increasing score among all possible equivalence 
classes is chosen for the next phase. Once a local maximum is determined in the first 
phase, we conduct backward equivalence search to sequentially delete a single edge in 
the second phase and compare the scores of DAG in equivalence classes repeatedly until 
a local maximum is reached. The search algorithm is terminated if the algorithm reaches 
a local maximum in the second phase. More details on the algorithms are in Chickering 
(2002, p. 520-24). 
Empirical Results 
This section discusses the empirical results for structural change and causality.  
Results of the Structural Change Analysis 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test results suggest that all series are non-stationary in 
levels (logarithms). The optimal lag length is two based on Hanna and Quinn’s (HQ) 
metrics for the VAR system. We employ both rolling and recursive cointegration 
methods to determine possible structural changes in the U.S cattle industry based on 
results of the time-varying trace tests. Generally, the sources of structural change in 
agricultural commodities come from policy change, supply shocks due to weather 
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abnormalities or disease outbreaks, and demand shocks like unexpected change of 
consumer preference. 
As shown in Figure 2.3, the normalized rolling trace test results suggest the presence 
of time-varying cointegration relationships among variables in the supply chain. 
Obviously, the null hypotheses of no cointegration (r = 0) and one cointegration vector 
(r ≤ 1) are rejected over the whole sample periods since all the trace test statistics are 
greater than one. Based on trace test results for the null hypotheses of two and three 
cointegration vectors (r ≤ 2 and r ≤ 3), minor regime changes in early 2001 and 2003 are 
detected. We speculate two events contribute to the instability of the cointegration, the 
Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting Act (LMPR) effective in April 2001 to stimulate 
competition in livestock markets including fed cattle market, and the BSE discovered in 
December 2003 in the U.S.  
The most striking evidence for instability of cointegration relationships detected in 
the null hypothesis of three cointegrating vectors (r ≤ 3) suggests a remarkable structural 
change between late 1996 and early 1997. Results suggest that four cointegration vectors 
exist prior to early 1997 while three cointegration vectors exist in most time intervals 
post early 1997. The regime change between late 1996 and early 1997 coincides with a 
turnaround of the U.S. cattle production cycle. The U.S. cattle production cycle typically 
occurs every 10 to 12 years, which consists of six to seven years of expanding, one to 
two years of consolidation, and three to four years of declining before the next cycle 
begins (Mundlack and Huang 1996). The U.S cattle cycle experienced a contraction 
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phase after the peak of cattle inventory in January 1996 (103.5 million head).3 Along 
with the cattle cycle, a strong inverse beef price cycle was found in the same period and 
the price spread between feeder calves, feeder cattle, and slaughter cattle widened after 
1996 (Hughes, 2002). The cattle cycle can greatly contribute to the transformation of 
market structure (Mathews et al., 1999). Grain shocks caused by a Midwestern draught 
between late 1995 and early 1996 may have amplified the cattle-cycle related market 
influences. The severe draught caused a remarkably high spike in corn price in 1996, 
which clearly affected profits throughout the beef supply chain. 
Figure 2.4 illustrates the results of the recursive cointegration tests. We reject the 
null hypotheses of zero, at most one, and at most two cointegration vectors. We fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of r ≤ 3 between late 1995 to early 1997, but reject the null 
hypothesis of r ≤ 4 since early 2002. Two regime changes were suggested, one between 
late 1995 and early 1997 that coincided with the grain price shock and the turnaround of 
cattle inventory cycle and another one in early 2002 that was likely induced by the 
LMPR Act.  
Based on results of the time-varying trace tests and our knowledge of historical 
events in the U.S. beef supply chain, we argue there were at least two regime changes, 
one corresponding to the 1996 grain shock and the turnaround of the U.S. cattle cycle 
and another one induced by the LMPR Act that became effective in 2001. However, we 
do not have sufficiently long series to analyze the post LMPR periods. Therefore, we 
                                                 
3 USDA reports that cattle inventory decreased to 94.9 million head in January 2004 (cyclical low), but it 
has been expanded since 2005 (94.9, 95.4, and 96.7 million head in January 2005, 2006, and 2007). 
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divide the entire sample period into two sub-periods according to the regime change 
between late 1996 and early 1997: pre-break periods (1988:1–1996:10) and post-break 
periods (1997:3–2005:8). We exclude the 4-month interval (1996:12–1997:2) from the 
analysis as transition periods, since the contemporaneous causal orderings are sensitive 
to including these periods. 
To validate the structural change, we conduct a recursive innovative accounting 
analysis and statistical tests for the homogeneity of two variance matrices and 
correlation matrices in the pre- and post-break periods 
(a) Recursive Innovative Accounting Analysis  
If there is a structural change, we should expect changes in recursive innovative 
accounting consisting of forecast error variance decompositions and impulse response 
functions after the structural break. Due to space limitation, we only present results of 
the impacts of captive supply and cattle inventory on spot market prices (feeder cattle 
price, fed cattle price, boxed beef price, and retail beef price) at 12-month or 24-month 
horizons in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. 
Results illustrated in Figure 2.5 show: (i) the influence of captive supply on forecast 
error variance of feeder cattle price is generally weaker in the post-break periods than in 
the pre-break periods; (ii) the effect of captive supply on forecast error variance of fed 
cattle price becomes stronger over time; and (iii) the influence of captive supply on the 
forecast error variance of boxed beef and retail beef prices increases sharply after mid 
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1999.4 Figure 2.5 suggests a dramatic decrease in the contribution of cattle inventory to 
forecast error variance of cattle and beef prices around 1996 but a reversal in 2001 so 
that after 2002 cattle inventory increases forecast error variance of cattle and beef prices. 
Figure 2.6 plots the orthogonalized impulse response function of four spot market prices 
responding to captive supply and cattle inventory, respectively. Results in Figure 2.6 
show that an increase in captive supply decreases the spot market prices in the majority 
of the pre-break periods.  However, starting in 1999, an increase in captive supply 
appears to increase cattle and beef prices. Also Figure 2.6 show that an increase in cattle 
inventory immediately decreases all four prices. Furthermore, the biggest price drops 
appear when the structural break occurred in 1996-1997.  Overall, the comparison of 
innovation accounting between the before- and after-break periods supports the 1996-
1997 structural change.  
 (b) Box-M and Jennrich Tests for the Homogeneity of Matrices 
Based on estimated VECMs in the pre- and post-break periods, we obtain two 
covariance matrices of contemporaneous innovations, 1Ω  and 2Ω , as well as two 
correlation matrices, 1Σ and 2Σ (see Table 2.1). If there is a structural change, the two 
covariance matrices or two correlation matrices should statistically differ from each 
other. We employ both the Box-M (Box 1949) for the equality of the two covariance 
matrices and the Jennrich test (1970) for the equality of the two correlation matrices. 
                                                 
4 Since 1999, beef demand has been strong and is improving. Demand has allowed record levels of beef 
production to continue moving through the system without further damage to the market value of cattle. 
With record retail price levels being set in 2001 and the increase in the retail beef demand index over the 
same period, there is plenty of evidence that beef demand has indeed improved. 
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Based on the sample covariance matrices ( 1Ω  and 2Ω ) we define the population 
covariance matrix by nn
i
ii∑
=
Ω=Ω
2
1
, where in  is number of observations to derive 
sample covariance matrix iΩ , and n is the number of the entire sample ( 21 nnn += ). As 
suggested by Mardia et al. (1979), when the sample size is small, the Box-M test statistic 
for the homogeneity of two covariance matrices is ( )∑
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γ , and s is the 
dimension of the covariance matrix. The Box-M test statistic is asymptotically 
distributed as a chi-square distribution with the degree of freedom 21)/ s(s + . However, 
Box-M test is not adapted for testing the equality of two correlation matrices. 
Jennrich (1970) proposed a chi-square test for the homogeneity of covariance as well 
as correlation matrices. The Jennrich test statistic for the homogeneity of two correlation 
matrices is ( )Ztr 221  where ( )⋅tr  is a trace operator, ( )2112/1 Σ−ΣΣ= −cZ , 
( )2121 nnnnc += , and ( ) ( )212211 nnnn +Σ+Σ=Σ . The Jennrich test statistic is 
asymptotically distributed as a chi-square distribution with the degree of 
freedom 21)/ s(s − . 
We have s = 9, 1061 =n , and 1021 =n . The statistic for the Box-M test (262.36) 
exceeds the critical value ( 17.71)45(2 =χ ), and the statistic for the Jennrich test 
(135.44) also exceeds the critical value ( 58.61)36(2 =χ  ) at the 1% significance level. 
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Hence, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the two variance matrices or the 
two correlation matrices of contemporaneous innovations differ from each other. Both 
the Box-M and Jennrich tests support the structural change. 
Results of Causality Tests 
Before conducting VECM estimation we need to determine the optimal lag length (k) 
and the rank of the cointegrating vectors (r). To validate the results, we use both the 
information criterion and trace tests to determine k and r sequentially and the model 
selection method based on information criteria to jointly determine k and r. The model 
selection method was first proposed by Phillips (1996) to jointly determine k and r. 
Wang and Bessler (2005) provide simulation evidence that shows model selection 
methods based on information criterion give at least as good fit as conventional Johansen 
system-based LR tests. Baltagi and Wang (2007) find model selection methods produce 
the same results as system-based LR tests in 70% of 165 published data sets. The 
empirical results based on both methods are consistent -- the optimal lag length is two 
and the rank of cointegrating vectors is four in both pre and post-break periods. In the 
rest of this section, we present the causality results. 
(a) Results of Granger Temporal Causality 
To test for temporal causality using out-of-sample Granger tests, we construct one-step-
ahead out-of-sample forecasts based on both the unrestricted and restricted VECMs 
formalized in equation (2.6) and compare mean squared forecast errors (MSFEs) 
between the unrestricted and restricted VECMs.  
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The unrestricted full model, including all nine variables with four cointegrating 
vectors, is estimated using observations from the first 60 monthly observations (1989:1–
1993:12) to obtain one-step-ahead forecasts for 1994:1 of the nine series. The model is 
then re-estimated using the first 61 observations (1989:1–1994:1) to obtain the one-step-
ahead forecasts for 1994:2 of the nine series. This procedure continues till the entire 
observations of the pre-break period are exhausted. Consequently, we obtain 34 one-
step-ahead out-of-sample forecasts (1994:1-1996:10) for the unrestricted full model and 
nine forecast error series with dimension of 34-by-1 for the unrestricted model. The trace 
test results show that the cointegration rank is four for the restricted models excluding 
captive supply, feeder cattle price, boxed beef price, fed cattle futures price, corn price, 
and Herfindahl-Hirschman index, respectively. The rank is three in the restricted models 
excluding cattle inventory, fed cattle spot price, and retail beef price, respectively. 
Similarly, we obtain recursive estimates of the restricted VECM model using the first 60 
monthly observations as a base sample. Consequently, we obtain 72 forecast error series 
(nine restricted models with eight variables). In total we have 81 forecast error series 
from the restricted and unrestricted models to conduct multivariate out-of-sample 
Granger causality tests. By comparing MSFEs between the unrestricted and restricted 
models, we find 46% (33 out of 72 cases) of the unrestricted models have lower MSFEs 
and, therefore, more accurate forecasts than the restricted model. This result invokes the 
principle of parsimony and over-fitting suggested by Box and Jenkins (1976). According 
to McCracken’s argument (1999), the unrestricted model having more extraneous 
variables generates accurate forecasts at least as well as the restricted model when we 
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implement in-sample forecasting. In the case of out-of-sample forecasting, the 
unrestricted model containing more regressors is not guaranteed to have better predictive 
ability than the restricted model. The unrestricted model has lower predictive ability 
when the number of irrelevant regressors increases in the unrestricted model. However, 
since the difference of the MSFEs between the restricted and unrestricted models is quite 
small, a statistical DM test for the equal forecasting errors is conducted based upon 
equation (2.7).  
Table 2.2 presents out-of-sample temporal granger causality test results.  The null 
hypothesis is that each series in the first row does not Granger-cause any particular 
series in the first column given inclusion of other series in the first column. In the pre-
break periods, captive supply Granger causes feeder cattle price, fed cattle futures price, 
and corn price. This implies that captive supply plays an important role in forecasting 
those prices. Meanwhile, captive supply is Granger caused by cattle inventory, fed cattle 
price, and retail beef price. Results indicate cattle inventory, fed cattle spot price, and 
retail beef price should be included to forecast one-month ahead captive supply. Cattle 
inventory is caused by HHI. Interestingly, fed cattle spot price and retail beef price are 
not caused by any other variables. In contrast, fed cattle futures price is caused by fed 
cattle spot price, retail beef price, corn price, and captive supply.  Corn price causes 
boxed beef price, fed cattle spot price, and HHI.      
Following the same procedure applied to the pre-break periods we conduct Granger 
causality tests for the post-break periods (1997:3-2005:8). With the same 60-month base 
widow, we obtain 42 one-step-ahead out-of-sample forecasts between 2002:3 and 2005:8. 
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As shown in Table 2.2, only six significant out-of-sample Granger causalities are found 
out of the 26 cases. That is, in six cases, the unrestricted model gives statistically better 
forecasting performance than the restricted model. In the post-break periods, captive 
supply Granger causes fed cattle price, which is opposite in the pre-break periods. Fed 
cattle price is also caused by feeder cattle price. Fed cattle price is warranted to forecast 
cattle inventory and fed cattle future price since they are caused by fed cattle price. 
Retail beef price is caused by boxed beef price.   
We summarize the overall results on Granger temporal causality tests in Figure 2.7. 
The temporal causal relations among variables in the U.S. beef supply chain became 
much weaker after the structural change.  Furthermore, in the post-break periods 
temporal causalities are mainly from upstream to downstream or in the same tier of the 
beef supply chain with the exception that fed cattle spot price Granger causes cattle 
inventory. 
(b) Results of DAG Contemporaneous Causality  
Table 2.1 shows the correlation matrices of contemporaneous innovations based on the 
estimated VECM in the pre- and post-break periods. Captive supply innovations are 
negatively correlated with most of other series in the U.S. beef supply chain, but are 
positively correlated with corn price in the pre-break periods, and feeder cattle price, 
retail beef price, and HHI in the post-break periods. Interestingly, captive supply 
innovations have a relatively stronger negative correlation with fed cattle spot price than 
that with other prices in both periods. Cattle inventory has negative correlations with 
other series except feeder cattle price in both periods and HHI in the post-break periods. 
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We also observe that innovations of spot cattle prices in the supply chain are highly 
correlated with each other except between feeder cattle price and retail beef price. 
The contemporaneous causal structure of innovations based on the results of DAGs 
can be identified through the estimated correlation matrix from the VECM (Spirtes, 
Glymour, and Scheines, 2000; Pearl, 2000; Swanson and Granger, 1997). As shown in 
Figure 2.7, two DAGs, generated using TETRAD IV’s GES algorithms, represent the 
direction of causal flows among variables in contemporaneous time in the pre- and post-
break periods.5  
Comparison of the two DAGs suggests that causalities change after the structural 
break in early 1997. The striking finding is that more contemporaneous causal 
relationships appear to be present in the post-break periods, which implies that 
information flow is quicker or more efficient within the beef supply chain in recent time 
than in times past. This is consistent with the temporal Granger causality results that 
show the opposite. Second, the direction of causalities appears to shift from downstream 
causal flows in the pre-break periods to upstream causal flows in the post-break periods. 
This means that before early 1997, most information in the supply chain appears to flow 
downstream, from cow-calf operations to packers.  After early 1997, most information in 
the supply chain appears to flow upstream from retailers and packers to feeders and cow-
calf operators. Further, before the structural break, it appears that price discovery in the 
supply chain occurred in box beef pricing where information from feeder steer prices, 
                                                 
5 This contemporaneous causal structure can be used in a Bernanke factorization for orthogonalization to 
generate impulse responses and forecast error variance decompositions to describe the dynamic structure. 
However, since our main interest is to examine the causal relationship in the U.S. beef supply chain we do 
not further report those results. Innovation accounting results are available upon requests. 
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cattle inventory, and captive supply comes together to determine boxed beef price, the 
most endogenous variable. After the structural break, it appears that price discovery in 
the supply chain occurred in feeder steer pricing where information from fed cattle price, 
captive supply, and cattle inventory comes together to determine feeder steer price, the 
most endogenous variable. This reversal in information flow may result from increased 
concentration and use of contracts by packers and retailers in recent times.  
Captive supply only indirectly causes fed cattle spot price in the pre-break periods, 
but it appears to directly cause feeder cattle price and fed cattle spot price in the post-
break periods. In other words, captive supply appears to exhibit an increased 
contemporaneous influence on prices along the supply chain, which supports the 
argument that “the use of non-cash procurement leads to pressure on the spot market 
price” as several previous empirical studies have found. In recent periods, we observe 
that retail beef price causes fed cattle futures price but retail beef price is independent of 
other variables in the pre-break periods. This may be evidence of increasing power of 
retailers in cattle market pricing in the post-break period. Cattle inventory appears to 
directly cause corn price in both periods and cause feeder cattle price in post-break 
periods. These results are consistent with market intuition since cattle inventory is a 
primary factor determining cattle supply and therefore feed demand. The HHI for market 
concentration appears to have no influence on cattle prices in contemporaneous time. 
This result seems counter intuitive since a higher HHI implies packers are highly 
concentrated and may exercise more monopsony power lowering live cattle prices. 
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Perhaps this result suggests the difference between the ability to exercise market power 
and the actual exercise of market power (Jones et al., 1996).       
Conclusions 
This study investigates causalities among variables in the U.S. beef supply chain also 
identifies structural changes. The identified causal relations provide important 
information for future studies of the U.S. beef supply chain and might be used to inform 
future policy interventions.  
Our empirical results suggest the following. First, based on the time-varying trace 
test results and the knowledge of historical events in the U.S. beef supply chain, we 
identify a significant structural change between late 1996 and early 1997 that 
corresponds to the 1996 grain shock and the turnaround of cattle inventory cycle. The 
2001 Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting Act (LMPR) may contribute to another 
structural change based on recursive estimates, but the change was minor based on the 
rolling estimates. Similarly, the 2003 U.S. BSE discovery caused only a minor structural 
change. The 1996-1997 structural change is supported by the Box-M and Jennrich test as 
well as by comparison of dynamic recursive impulse responses and forecast error 
variance decomposition between two periods.  
Second, we find that causal relationships in the U.S. beef supply chain changed after 
the structure change. Overall, the temporal causality becomes weaker but the 
contemporaneous causality becomes stronger after the structural break. The stronger 
contemporaneous causality after the structural break implies that new information or 
shocks emanating from a particular segment of the supply chain is more quickly and/or 
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efficiently transmitted to the rest of the supply chain in the post-break periods compared 
with the pre-break periods. We speculate that faster and/or efficient information 
transmission along the supply chain results from increasing use of more efficient vertical 
coordination and contractual arrangements and possibly from implementation of 
mandatory livestock price reporting that improved fed cattle price reporting. In the post-
break periods, the temporal causalities are mainly from upstream to downstream or in 
the same tier of the beef supply chain, while contemporaneous causalities indicate 
information flows downstream from retailers and packers to feeders and cow-calf 
operators. One might speculate that price discovery occurs in more competitive markets 
where market influences are more quickly incorporated into price.  The switch in the 
point of price discovery from box beef price before 1997 to feeder cattle price after 1997 
may be an indication that increased concentration and increased use of contracts by 
packers and retailers to gain greater economic control of supply chain.   
Third, both the temporal and contemporaneous causality results show that captive 
supply directly causes fed cattle spot price in the post-break periods but only indirectly 
effects fed cattle price in the pre-break periods. The causal relationship between captive 
supply and fed cattle spot price strongly supports the argument that “the use of non-cash 
procurement leads to pressure on the spot market price” in several other empirical 
studies.  
Clearly, increasing concentration and increased use of contracts to coordinated 
production and exchange between different tiers in the U.S. beef supply chain has 
affected the influence of different players in the system.  Improved understanding of 
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causal linkages among the different segments of the U.S. beef supply chain has rich 
policy implications for both policy makers and market participants. While it remains 
challenging to uncover causal relationships among variables using non-experimental 
observational data, the methods available today are allowing applied economists to gain 
some new understanding. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONTRACT PRICING AND PACKER COMPETITION IN THE 
FED CATTLE MARKET 
 
Recently, the U.S. cattle industry has undergone structural changes including increased 
concentration and a greater degree of quasi-vertical integration coordinated through 
contract procurement often referred to as captive supplies.6 An implication of these 
trends is that packers are rapidly switching from traditional spot procurement in fed 
cattle markets to contract procurement. Possible motives for the switch to use contract 
procurement are to reduce price variability and manage risk and also to reduce 
transaction costs. Both packers and cattle producers can potentially benefit from contract 
sales as packers insure themselves against quantity short falls and price fluctuations and 
cattle producers secure reliable sales and smooth price volatility. For packers, a primary 
benefit from use of captive supply is to secure fed cattle requirements so packing plants 
can operate at the highest possible level of capacity utilization.  In addition, they can 
potentially gain control over the type and quality of cattle and reduce procurement costs. 
However, contract procurement can reduce public market information because contract 
prices are frequently not reported due to nondisclosure rules. Furthermore, contract 
procurement may reduce competition in the fed cattle spot market, potentially leading to 
increased market power for packers (Ward and Schroeder, 1997). Contract procurement 
                                                 
6 GIPSA defines “captive supply” as cattle owned or fed by a packer, procured through forward contracts 
and marketing agreements, and cattle that are otherwise committed to a packer more than 14 days prior to 
slaughter.  
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potentially allows packers to exercise price discrimination in procurement as different 
prices may be paid for cattle purchased through contracts and cattle procured through 
traditional spot markets. Hence, concerns about competitiveness among meatpackers 
arise.  
While the evidence is not conclusive, most previous empirical studies generally 
suggest a negative relationship between captive supplies and spot market prices. Elam 
(1992) found individual states, Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, and Texas, varied from no 
price difference to price reductions ranging from $0.15/cwt to $0.37/cwt.  Hayenga and 
O’Brien (1992) compare the average weekly fed cattle price in the same four states and 
found no conclusive evidence that forward contracting decreased fed cattle prices. 
Schroeter and Azzam (2003) show a small statistically significant negative effect of 
captive supply volume on cash prices. 
While most previous studies do not examine how contracts facilitate or extend 
market power, MacDonald, et al. (2004) argue that contracts can potentially amplify 
market power through entry deterrence, reduced price competition, and discriminatory 
pricing. They found packers have an incentive to use contract as a strategic variable for 
the purpose of increasing market power. Only a few theoretical studies have investigated 
how captive supplies may be used as a strategy to create or extend packer market power 
(Love and Burton, 1999; Zhang and Sexton, 2000; Wang and Jaenicke, 2006). Love and 
Burton (1999) formalize a strategic rationale whereby packers might use captive supplies 
to extend market power in cattle procurement. They show that a dominant beef 
processing firm has an incentive to backwardly integrate to simultaneously escape 
  
39
 
efficiency loss and exercise market power in spot market procurements. However, their 
model does not predict an unambiguous effect of backward integration on spot market 
price. Using a spatial model, Zhang and Sexton (2000) examine how strategic captive 
supply procurement can affect spot market price. Their model shows that the spot market 
cattle price can be reduced as transportation cost rises. Wang and Jaenicke (2006) show 
that how captive supplies affect the expected spot price under a formula price contract 
using a principal-agent approach. 
Cattle feeders have increasing concerns about the effect of “Top-of-the-Market-
Pricing (hereafter TOMP)” contracts on prices paid by packers for fed cattle.7 Contract 
prices are often established based on either nearby spot market price or fed cattle futures 
market price. For example, under TOMP clauses, contract base price paid to producers is 
set as the highest spot price at delivery time. With TOMP clauses, packers have an 
incentive to compete less aggressively in spot markets in order to reduce input cost in 
contract markets. Recently, Xia and Sexton (2004) examined the effect of coexistence of 
spot and contract markets in a one-shot game framework where contract price is 
determined through TOMP clauses. They find that TOMP clauses reduce competition in 
the spot market and lower producers’ profits.  Ironically, they find that feeders favor the 
contract even though TOMP clauses lead to anti-competitive consequences for feeders. 
Even with lower equilibrium prices Xia and Sexton demonstrate that signing TOMP 
clauses is a dominant strategy for producers because a producer will suffer more loss 
                                                 
7 TOMP clause is discussed first by Davis (2000) 
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without contracts. Their findings, however, are based on the assumption that contract 
price cannot deviate from spot market price. 
In practice, contract prices reflect both observed and unobserved hedonic 
characteristics of fed cattle and stochastic market related influences. With heterogeneous 
quality characteristics, contract prices might deviate from spot prices giving packers a 
degree of latitude in setting contract price. In such a situation, packers have an incentive 
to transform bidding strategies in spot markets resulting in additional complications with 
respect to understanding the consequences of TOMP clauses on spot market price. For 
example, when there is a sufficiently large set of hedonic characteristics it may become 
hard to find the highest spot market price of the same kind of fed cattle. Widely 
heterogeneous hedonic characteristics will make it physically infeasible to trace the price 
on the spot markets for the same quality of cattle. 
We extend Xia and Sexton’s work on TOMP clauses by considering the effects of 
hedonic characteristics on contract price. This study addresses how contracts affect 
packer market power using a general pricing scheme which considers hedonic 
characteristics of cattle quality. We employ a stage game to investigate the effects of the 
contract procurement on packer competition in the spot market. In particular, we assume 
a more general relationship between contract price and spot market price, which allows 
us to capture the impacts of captive supply, hedonic characteristics of fed cattle, and 
unobserved stochastic components. Previous models are also extended by assuming 
cattle feeders may be risk averse. 
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The Model Structure 
We assume a duopsony case in which there are two packers and N cattle feeders who are 
engaged in contract and spot markets. Each feeder only participates in one market, either 
the contract market or the spot market. We assume that feeders are risk averse and also 
price takers (i.e., non-strategic players). Packers are assumed to be risk neutral and to 
maximize expected profit from both markets. To facilitate the definition of notations, we 
use superscripts “c” and “s” to represent contract and spot markets, subscript i for packer 
i where i=A, B, and subscript k for feeder k where k=1, 2, …, N.  
Price Formulation in Both Markets 
Spot market fed cattle prices are determined by negotiation or bidding. The bidding 
process for fed cattle procurement in spot market resembles a type of first-price sealed-
bid auction, in which, the highest bidder wins the cattle in a feedlot. Formula pricing 
with various types of base price are the most general pricing method for fed cattle 
transactions in the contract market. The formula base price is usually derived from the 
various external prices including the average price paid at a slaughter plant, wholesale 
prices, futures prices, or reported market average prices (Ward, Schroeder and Feuz, 
1997). Fed cattle may be valued on live weight basis, carcass (dressed) weight basis, or 
grid pricing. Live weight or carcass pricing methods apply a uniform average price for 
the entire lot, while grid pricing is established on a carcass basis. Most spot market sales 
are priced on a live weight basis while contact sales are based on carcass weight since 
most formulas are based upon dressed weights.  
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We assume feeders who accept the contract are paid a higher base price than in the 
spot market. However, on average, the observed contract price can deviate from the base 
price to reflect cattle quality attributes or so-called hedonic characteristics. Pricing 
methods in both spot and contract markets are linked to cattle quality attributes, mkz , 
associated with feeder k and cattle market m (spot = s or contract = c). Various factors 
differentiate cattle quality attributes, including average live weight of cattle, average 
dressing percentage of cattle, number of head in the lot, distance from the feedlot to 
slaughter plant, type of cattle, yield grade and quality grade of feedlots. We emphasize 
one particular factor which plays a vital role in determining cattle quality, the effort of 
each feeder. Feeders’ efforts, denoted by mke , influence management-based activities 
which are important to quality attributes. Therefore, quality difference which causes 
price differentiation in each feedlot is reflected in different feeder effort levels. 
Assumption 1. The hedonic characteristic function is  
(3.1) m
m
k
m
k ee εδ +=)(z     
 where mε  is unobserved stochastic component in each market m with  
( ) 0=mE ε , ( ) 2zσε =mVar and δ  is quality price premium. Realized hedonic 
characteristics, )( mkez  is assumed to follow a normally distribution which depends on 
feeders’ efforts: ( )2,~)( zz σδ mkmk eNe . The marginal effect of feeders’ effort on cattle 
expected quality attributes and variance are δ=∂
∂
m
k
m
k
e
e )(z  and ( ) 0)( =∂∂ mk
m
k
e
eVar z
. We 
assume the effects are the same in both the contract and cash markets. Assumption 1 
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suggests a constant and positive marginal effect of feeders’ effort on cattle quality 
attributes, 0>δ . Feeders utilizing a higher effort level will delivery a better quality 
attributes of their cattle. However, the expected cattle attributes, )( mkez , which depend 
on feeder’s effort level, may not be the same in both the contract and spot market even 
though the marginal effect is constant with respect to different markets. If equilibrium 
price is higher in one market, feeders may exercise more effort because the marginal 
gain is higher. Packers pay for quality attributes rather than feeders’ effort level. Thus, a 
potential moral hazard problem is avoided since quality attributes can be observed in 
both spot and contract markets, while feeders’ effort is privately held information.8  
Assumption 2. Spot market transaction price paid to feeder k is    
(3.2) s
s
k
ss
k
ss
k ewewW εδ ++=+= )(z  
where sw is a market clearing price component not relating to hedonic quality attributes 
in spot market. Assumption 2 suggests that actual transaction price in the spot market 
can be decomposed into a market price component and a non-market hedonic price 
component. The market price component, sw , can be considered as the spot market 
equilibrium price resulting from equilibrium between demand and supply in spot market. 
Assumption 3. Contract market transaction price paid to feeder k is 9 
(3.3) c
c
k
sc
k
sc
k ewewW εδββ +++=++= )1()()1( z  
                                                 
8 Packer does not care about feeder’s effort level even though it has an effect on mkz  since a packer is only 
paying for the quality actually observed or obtained when she prices the cattle in both market. Thus, the 
pricing method which depend in part on feeder’s effort level naturally induces feeder’s best effort in both 
markets. 
9 Xia and Sexton’s model assume the deviation of contract price from spot market price is not allowed. In 
their model, contract price for each feeder is always same with the spot price: sscj
c
i wWhWW === )(  
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Assumption 3 is consistent with the linear procurement contract commonly used in cattle 
industry. Packers normally procure cattle by lot instead of buying individual cattle. Thus, 
reported prices are based on the average cattle characteristics of the lots sold in specified 
periods and geographic areas. We assume the average spot market price as the base price 
of contract market. Hedonic characteristics of cattle sold in the contract market are 
included in contract market pricing to reflect quality differences between each feedlot in 
the contract market. In the linear contract, packer’s choice variable is β, or the price 
premium or discount paid for contact cattle in relation to cattle purchased in the spot 
market. We expect β is greater than 0, which ensures that feeders who accept contract 
will have a higher price than those in the spot market. We will examine our expectation 
later to confirm. 
Assumption 4. Output market price (boxed beef price) paid to packer is given by: 
(3.4) ( )mmkmkm epepp εδ ++=+= ~)(~ z  
Assumption 4 suggests that reported output (beef) prices also depend on the average 
cattle quality provided by the packers. 
Stage Game 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the stage game by specifying the actions undertaken by packers and 
feeders and the corresponding choice variables in each stage. We assume this game 
evolves in two stages, and both contract and spot markets sequentially evolve.  
• Stage I: Each packer, A and B, chooses contract terms, β, which results in a 
number of contract feeders, cAn  and 
c
Bn , who signed a contract. Given contract 
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terms, β, feeders decide whether to signed a contract with a packer i and choose 
the optimal output and effort level to maximize their expected utility. 
• Stage II: ( cBcA nnN −− ) feeders who sell their products in the spot market choose 
the optimal output and effort level to maximize their expected utility. Packers 
choose the quantities of cattle to purchase in the spot market to maximize 
expected profit. 
In first stage, packers decide weights that they apply to the average spot market price as 
the base price and the price premium paid to certain quantity attributes. Feeders who are 
offered the contract decide to accept or reject the offer. Feeders will accept the contract 
if they obtain a high profit by participating in the contract market. We assume that 
feeders who are offered the contract always accept the contract to sell on the contract 
market when solving the stage game.10 We revisit this issue by compare the profit 
without contract and with contract later to confirm our assumption. 
In second stage, all feeders no matter whether they accept the contract or not, choose 
an effort level to optimally produce quality attributes. Packers A and B compete in the 
spot market to purchase cattle that are not committed in the contract market to maximize 
expected profit. That is, packers A and B purchase cattle from sAn  and 
s
Bn  feeders in the 
spot market. Given the game structure illustrated in Figure 3.1, we use backward 
induction to analytically solve for the Bayes perfect equilibrium.  
                                                 
10 In real market contract price is, on average, higher than spot price. Xia and Sexton (2004) show why 
rational producers accept the contract  
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Stage II: Spot Market 
Suppose that )( cB
c
A nn +  feeders already signed the contract with a processing firm. There 
are )( cB
c
A nnN +−  feeders left in the spot market to sell their fed cattle. Aggregate spot 
market supply is assumed to result from feeder’s cost given by: 
(3.5.a) ( )2
2
1)( sk
s
k eec = , and  
(3.5.b)  ( )2
2
1)( sk
s
k xxc = ,  
where cost, )(⋅c  is a positive increasing function of effort, ske . Each feeder’s profit 
function in spot market is given by: 
(3.6) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ +−= 22, 2121 sksksksksFk exxWπ ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ +−++= 22 2121 skskskssks exxew εδ .  
where skx  is quantity produced by an individual feeder in spot market. Also, we assume 
that each feeder can be characterized as maintaining constant absolute risk adverse 
preferences given by an exponential utility. Since, revenue is normally distributed, 
feeder k’s expected utility function can be expressed as an increasing concave function 
of the mean-variance utility which corresponds to the certainty equivalent value of 
revenue. 
(3.7)  )(
2
)()( ,,, sFk
sF
k
sF
k VarEEU πγππ −= .  
where 0>γ  is a constant absolute risk aversion parameter.  The variance of feeder k’s 
profit is given by  
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(3.8) ( ) ssksksFk eeEVar ,2222, )()()( zzz σδδπ =−= . 
Then, we can rewrite feeder k’s expected utility function using (3.6) and (3.8)  
(3.9) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2222, )(
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k
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k xexxewEU z
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⎛ +−+=  .    
From equation (3.9), we obtain individual feeder’s spot supply function as follows:  
(3.10.a) 21 zγσ
δ
+
+=
s
k
s
s
k
ewx . 
Cost of effort for an individual feeder in the spot market is as follows: 
(3.10.b) sk
s
k xe δ= . 
Substituting equation (3.10.b) into equation (3.10.a) gives an individual feeder’s spot 
supply function can be rewritten as:  
(3.11) ( )221 δγσ −+= z
s
s
k
wx . 
The cost of effort in spot market is:  
(3.12) ( )221 δγσδ −+= z
s
s
k
we . 
From equation (3.11), aggregate feeder spot market supply is:  
(3.13) ( )221 )()( δγσ −+ −−=−−= z
sc
B
c
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k
c
B
c
A
s
S
wnnNxnnNX . 
Equilibrium spot market demand with two packers requires:  
(3.14) sB
s
A
s
D XXX += . 
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The market is cleared when sD
s
S XX =  and the market equilibrium spot price, sw , is 
established when aggregate supply equals aggregated demand. From equation (3.12) and 
(3.13), we obtain spot market equilibrium price:  
(3.15) ( ) ( )( )
)(
1 22
c
B
c
A
s
B
s
As
nnN
XXw −−
−++= δγσ z . 
Total profit for packer i from both the contract and spot market procurement is: 
(3.16) );,(][][ vsi
c
i
s
i
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i
c
i XXTCXWpXWp −−+−=π    for  i = A, B                   
where )(⋅TC  is total processing cost for packer i, which is assumed to be constant returns 
to scale, min  is a number of feeders in the contract (m=c) or spot (m=s) markets. In stage 
II, packers choose the quantity of cattle to purchase in the spot market, siX , given that 
he/she already has a contract quantity, ciX . That is, packer i maximizes expected profit 
specified in equation (3.16) by choosing siX . Taking the derivate of equation (3.16) with 
respect to siX  yields packer i’s best response function:  
(3.17)
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Based on equation (3.17) we are able to derive the best response function of each packer: 
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Solving equations (3.18.a) and (3.18.b) simultaneously yields the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium quantities, ( sB
s
A XX , ), in the spot market conditional on the contract market 
equilibrium: 
(3.19.a) ( )( ) ( )32)1(13
~)(
22
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c
A
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c
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−−= βδγσ z .  
Substituting equations (3.19.a) and (3.19.b) into equation (3.15) yields the spot market 
equilibrium price not relating with quality attributes: 
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Using the result from substitution of spot market equilibrium price into the individual 
feeder’s spot supply function of equation (3.10.a) and spot market effort cost function of 
equation (3.12), we obtain actual spot market price paid to feeder k from equation.  
( )( )( ) ( )( ) sckcBcA
c
B
c
As
k xnnN
nnpW εγσβδγσ
γσ +−−
+++−−+
+=
)(3
1)1(
13
~12 2
22
2
z
z
z .   
Output spot price paid to packer i from equation (3.4) can be rewritten as:  
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Stage I: Contract Market 
In the contract market, the model structure for each feeder is the same as in the spot 
market.  Thus, the feeder k’s expected utility function in contract market is:  
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From equation (3.20), we obtain individual feeder’s supply and cost of effort in the 
contract market as:  
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Substituting equation (3.22) into equation (3.21), an individual feeder’s contract supply 
can be rewritten as ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
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effort in the contract market is ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
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Further, since aggregate contract market feeder supply is, ck
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price, ckW , and output price, 
cp , are respectively: 
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Total expected profit for packer i is:   
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 (3.23) { });,(][][ vsicisisisckcAcici XXTCXWpxnWpEE −−+−=π    for  i = A, B. 
Feeders maximize expected profit in the first stage by choosing optimal quantity and 
number of contract feeders. We assume homogenous feeders, individual and aggregate 
supply, cost of effort, market clearing spot price, and output price in both the contract 
and spot market can be rewritten as:     
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With these results, expected packer profit given in equation (3.23) can be rewritten as:  
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To maximize packer i’s expected profit, the derivative of packer i’s total profit given by 
equation (3.24) is obtained with respect to β and S , and the resulting first order 
conditions define the packer’s optimal choices for β and S .  
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Unfortunately, no closed form solution can be obtained for these equations. However, a 
numeric solution for the equilibrium can be obtained using equations (3.25.a) and 
(3.25.b). Figure 3.2 shows conditions under which the first order conditions are satisfied 
for β and S . The Bayes perfect Nash-equilibrium requires the two first order conditions 
to be simultaneously satisfied. Figure 3.3 presents numerical results for Bayes perfect 
Nash equilibrium that shows 09.1* =β  and NS ⋅= 405.0* .  
The result of 09.1* =β  satisfies our expectation that feeders who accept a packer 
contract receive a higher price than in the spot market. Therefore, packer contract 
purchases impose an externality on spot market competition. That is, contract 
transactions are used by packers to exercise 2nd degree price discrimination by exercising 
differential pricing in the spot and contract market. This result is consistent with Xia and 
Sexton’s (2004) TOMP study. The equilibrium solution also shows the optimal number 
of contract feeders represents 40.5% of all feeders in the industry. Figure 2 shows 
*β and *S in case of total one hundred of feeders (N = 100) in both spot and contract 
market.  
Comparative Static Results 
We conduct comparative static analysis to better understand how changes in output price 
( p~ ), feeder risk aversion (γ), the price premium of paid for quality attributes (δ ), and 
the variation in the effects of feeder effort on hedonic quality attributes ( 2σ ) affect 
feeder supply, cattle prices, and optimal feeder effort in both spot and contract markets. 
To obtain the comparative statistic results, the first order equations (3.25.a) and (3.25.b) 
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for optimal S and β are totally differentiated with respect to the four parameters 
( 2,,,~ σδγp ) and then simultaneously solved using Cramer’s rule. 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarize the comparative statistic results. The results show that 
output price ( p~ ), and price premium paid for quality attributes (δ ) have positive effects 
on feeder supply, cattle prices, and optimal feeder effort level in both the spot and 
contract markets. In contrast, feeder risk aversion (γ), and the variation in the effects of 
feeder effort on hedonic quality attributes ( 2σ ) negatively affect feeder supply, cattle 
prices, and optimal feeder effort in both spot and contract markets. 
Conclusions 
Packers are rapidly switching from traditional spot procurement in fed cattle markets to 
contract procurement. Possible motives for the switch to use contract procurement are to 
reduce price variability and manage risk and possibly increase product quality. However, 
contract procurement may reduce competition in the fed cattle spot market, potentially 
leading to increased market power for packers (Ward and Schroeder, 1997). Contract 
procurement potentially allows packers to exercise price discrimination in procurement 
as different prices may be paid for cattle purchased through contracts and cattle procured 
through traditional spot markets. Hence, concerns about competitiveness among 
meatpackers arise. 
A game-theoretic framework is used to analyze the coexistence of spot and contract 
markets in the cattle industry in a framework that allows both endogenously determined 
quality and risk adverse feeders. We consider two packers competing for purchases from 
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N feeders to reflect the cattle industry. Results show that packers find it optimal to use 
contract markets to price discriminate between purchases made in the contract and spot 
markets. This may be one reason why packers only purchase a portion of cattle in the 
contract market. Packers have an incentive to maintain contract and spot market 
purchases as a means to exercising price discrimination between markets and risk 
adverse feeders and quality attributes alone cannot explain the price differentials 
generated in equilibrium.  
Comparative static results show that output price and price premium paid for quality 
attributes have positive effects on feeder supply, cattle prices, and optimal feeder effort 
in both the spot and contract markets. In contrast, feeder risk aversion and the variation 
in the effects of feeder effort on hedonic quality attributes negatively affect feeder 
supply, cattle prices, and optimal feeder effort in both spot and contract markets. 
The results may shed light on understanding potential effects of captive supplies on 
market power and may aid in the assessment of the policies designed to enhance 
competition in the cattle industry. However, there are a number of limitations. In this 
study, we imposed symmetric conditions between production in the spot and contract 
markets. These conditions may be too strict. Further, it is not possible to obtain a closed 
form solution in for current model. Future work should include a welfare analysis of the 
effects on market participants of changes in important model parameters.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE IMPACT OF ANIMAL DISEASE CRISES ON THE KOREAN 
MEAT MARKET 
 
There has been a long-standing concern related to animal disease since bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was first discovered in the United Kingdom in 1986. 
This concern has been increasing since the United Kingdom announced a possible link 
of BSE and the human version of the virus, vCJD, in 1996. Animal disease related food 
scares, especially when disease can spread to humans, alter meat consumption and meat 
prices along with the loss of consumer confidence in food safety and the resulted 
distortion in meat supply. The adverse impacts of animal disease outbreaks are beyond 
domestic phenomena as the food supply chain becomes increasingly global. Food scares 
or food safety risks emanating from foreign countries can be realized in domestic 
markets of importing countries, and shocks from localized animal disease outbreaks can 
be quickly transmitted to other regions and countries. For example, the BSE discovery in 
the United Kingdom in 1996 caused disruptions in meat markets world wide (Kenneth et 
al., 2002).   
In this study we investigate the impacts of animal disease outbreaks on the Korean 
meat market. Since the of turn of the century, the Korean meat market has been affected 
by three animal disease outbreaks: a FMD (Foot and Mouth Disease) outbreak in Korea 
in April 2000, an AI (Avian Influenza) outbreak in Korea in December 2003, and the 
first BSE discovery in the U.S. in December 2003. We did not consider BSE discoveries 
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in Canada and the United Kingdom since Korea imports meat mainly from the United 
States. Korea banned beef imports from the U.S. immediately after the 2003 U.S. BSE 
discovery, and it did not lift the import ban till July, 2007 when boneless beef could 
again be imported from the U.S. to Korea. Thus, we did not consider the BSE 
discoveries in the U.S. in 2005.  
We employ time series methods, mainly the error correction model (ECM) and 
historical decomposition of price innovations, accompanied by directed acyclic graphs 
(DAGs), to investigate in-depth the impacts of multiple disease outbreaks on prices of 
different meat types (beef, pork, chicken) at different levels of the marketing channel 
(retail, wholesale, and farm levels), price margin along the supply chain, and price 
interdependence in the meat system. This study offers the following contributions to the 
literature. First, we consider multiple animal disease outbreaks of different disease types 
(AI, BSE, FMD) with different country of origin (domestic versus oversea). Hence, we 
are able to investigate differential impacts. Second, to our knowledge, this study is the 
first that simultaneously investigates the impacts of animal disease outbreaks on meat 
prices, the price margin along the supply chain, and price interdependence in the meat 
system. Accordingly, it provides a broader understanding of the impacts of disease 
outbreaks. Third, the majority of literature investigates impacts of animal disease 
outbreaks on meat markets in the U.S., Canada, and European countries. There are some 
studies that investigate Japanese markets responding to food scares (Jin et al., 2003; 
McCluskey et al., 2005; Peterson and Chen, 2005; Saghaian et al., 2007). Song and Chae 
(2007) is the first attempt to examine the impacts of BSE on the Korea meat market 
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(written in Korean). In particular, they estimate the social loss from the U.S. BSE 
outbreaks. Other than that, to our knowledge there is no study that systematically 
investigates the Korean meat market. This study will fill this gap and provide another 
country specific analysis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a 
literature review on food safety and animal disease-related food scares.  We then present 
time series analysis, including ECM and historical decomposition of price innovations, 
in section 3. We provide an overview of the Korean meat market and the market 
responses to animal disease outbreaks in section 4 and discuss the data in section 5. 
Empirical results are presented in section 6, and conclusions are discussed in the last 
section.  
Literature Review on Animal Disease Related Food Scares 
`There is a rich literature investigating the impacts of animal disease outbreaks on meat 
demand. Burton and Young (1996) show that BSE has significantly negative impacts on 
the domestic beef demand using a dynamic almost ideal demand system (AIDS). Piggot 
and Marsh (2004) find a minimal impact of food safety information on meat demand. 
The larger demand responses correspond to major food scare shocks, but these responses 
are quickly dampened. Peterson and Chen (2005) find that following the BSE discovery 
in Japan in September 2001 there was a structural change in the Japanese meat market in 
September followed by a two-month transition. McCluskey et al. (2005) find that the 
consumption of domestic and imported beef in Japan drastically dropped by 70% in 
November 2001 two month after the Japanese BSE discovery.  Using a unique UPC-
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level scanner data set, Schlenker and Villa Boss (2006) find a pronounced and 
significant reduction in beef sales following the first BSE discovery in the U.S, but the 
effect dissipates over the next three months.  
A stream of literature focuses on the impact of animal disease outbreaks on meat 
prices. Lloyd et al. (2001) find that beef prices at the retail, wholesale and producer 
levels in the United Kingdom are estimated to have fallen by 1.7, 2.25, and 3.0 pence per 
kilogram in the long-run after the British government in 1996 announced a possible link 
between BSE and it’s human version, vCJD. Pritchet et al. (2005) argue that the 2003 
US BSE discovery led to a 14% decrease in the choice boxed beef price and a 20% 
decrease in the fed cattle price between December 22nd 2003 and January 8th 2004. 
Leeming and Turner (2004) find a negative effect of the BSE crisis on beef price but a 
positive effect on lamb price in the United Kingdom.  
There is a broad literature on the farm and retail price margin and what factors may 
influence price transmission since Gardner’s (1975) work. However, the literature on 
price transmission affected by animal disease is relative thin. Using Johansen’s 
cointegration approach, Sanjuan and Dawson (2003) find that retail-to-farm price margin 
of beef increased following the BSE discovery in 1996. Similar increases were not found 
in the lamb and pork markets. Lloyd et al. (2006) find that the impact of BSE on farm 
price is much bigger than retail price and, hence, the retail-to-farm price margin became 
wider due to the 1996 UK BSE discovery.  
Other studies investigate the impact of food scares on prices of stock, equity, and 
futures in commodity markets (Salin and Hooker, 2001; Wang et al., 2002; Henson and 
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Mazzocchi, 2002; Lusk and Schroeder, 2002). Henson and Mazzocchi (2002) find that 
the BSE discovery in 1996 had a negative and immediate impact on the equity prices of 
24 companies in the United Kingdom. Lusk and Schroeder (2002) find that beef and 
pork recalls only have marginal effects on live cattle and hog futures prices. Schlenker 
and Villas-Boas (2006) find that futures prices have a comparable drop compared with 
the estimated price change using the scanner data, but contracts with longer maturity 
have a smaller price drop response to the first U.S. BSE discovery.  
This study will mainly focus on the impact of animal disease outbreaks on meat 
prices, price margin, and the interdependence among prices in the Korean meat market.  
Econometric Model 
To identify and quantify the impacts of animal disease outbreaks on the Korean meat 
market we employ time series methods, mainly the error correction model (ECM), and 
historical decomposition of price innovations. The ECM will allow us to compare the 
actual price that is affected by animal disease shocks and the forecasted price that uses 
only information before the animal disease outbreak occurs. The comparison will 
quantify the impacts on meat prices as well as price margin along the supply chain. 
However, the comparison cannot illustrate dynamic changes in the meat price system 
due to disease outbreaks. In other words, due to substitution between different meat 
types and the supply chain integration, an animal disease outbreak will potentially affect 
meat consumptions and meat prices at all the levels within the supply chain. We expect 
that the net impacts on a certain price series, say, the retail beef price, come from the 
own-price changes as well as the changes of other meat prices.  We use a historical 
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decomposition of price innovations to identify the dynamic interdependence within the 
meat price system and to quantify the contribution of each price series on the net change 
of a certain meat price following an animal disease outbreak.  
 Error Correction Model  
We denote the total number of price series of interest by I and the time period by t. 
Based on the Johansen’s cointegrated vector autoregression (VAR) model with k lags 
(Johansen, 1988), the data generating process of tX , where X t  is a I × 1 vector of price 
series, can be modeled in ECM with k-1 lags:  
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where Δ  is the difference operator such that 1−−=Δ ttt XXX , both Π and Γi are I × I 
parameter matrices, and te  is a  I × 1 vector of price innovations that are not necessarily 
orthogonal. We also include eleven monthly dummies to account for seasonality and a 
constant. There are different forms of deterministic terms in the ECM (See Lütkepohl, 
2005). We consider cases with or without linear trend. Hence, equation (4.1) becomes  
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where μ , μ1 , and μ 2 are I × 1 parameter vectors.  
There are different approaches to determine the optimal lag length of a VAR 
representation (k) and the rank of cointegration vectors (r). The first approach is a two-
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step procedure involving system-based likelihood ratio (LR) tests. The procedure is as 
follows: (a) determine the number of lags using information matrices such as Schwarz-
loss criterion (SIC), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Hannan and Quinn-loss (HQ), 
and Hacker and Hatemi-J (HJ) metrics; and (b) given the optimal lag length, determine 
the rank of cointergration vectors based on a trace test (Johansen, 1988 and 1991) with 
test statistic given by 
(4.3) Trace = )1ln(
1
i
k
ri
T λ∑
+=
−−                                                                   
where T is the number of observations and λi’s are ordered eigenvalues of  matrix Π in 
equations (4.2.a) and (4.2.b). This approach is popular due to its sound theoretical basis, 
computational simplicity, and superior performance relative to some other estimators 
(Brüggemann and Lütkepohl, 2005). However, the two-step procedure might not be free 
from a model specification problem which ultimately involves a trade-off between 
model parsimony and fit, given the fact that the true model is rarely known (Wang and 
Bessler, 2005). Boswijk and Franses (1992) state that the choice of lag length in a VAR 
model in the first step has an important impact on the cointegration test performance.  
Recently, model selection methods based on information criteria have been proposed 
and implemented as an alternative and a robustness test for conventional two-step 
procedure in Johansen type’s VECM specification (Phillips and McFarland, 1997; Aznar 
and Salvador, 2002; and Baltagi and Wang, 2007). There are at least three advantages of 
the model selection method compared with system-based LR tests. First, it is possible to 
jointly estimate the cointegration rank and the optimal lag length in a VAR (Phillips, 
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1996). Second, the model selection method relieves researchers from the arbitrary choice 
of appropriate significance level in contrast with formal hypothesis testing such as 
system-based LR tests. Third, Chao and Phillips (1999) and Wang and Bessler (2005) 
provide simulation evidences to show the model selection methods based on information 
criterion give at least as good fit as system-based LR tests.  
Geweke and Meese (1981) argue that SIC loss may have a tendency to over-penalize 
additional regressors in contrast to other metrics. Hannan and Quinn (1979) suggest that 
HQ performs better than SIC in large samples since HQ gives more consistent results. 
We use HQ information criterion to jointly determine the optimal lag length and the rank 
of cointegration vectors,  
(4.4) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+Ω=
T
TnkHQ k
)ln(ln2)ˆln(det      
where kΩˆ is the maximum likelihood estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of Ω  
given lag length k and cointegration rank r, n is the number of variables, and T is the 
number of observations.  
Historical Decomposition 
Historical decomposition is suitable for the investigation of atypical market events 
coming from the unanticipated exogenous (demand or supply) shocks such as the oil 
supply shocks (Kilian, 2008) or the 1987 US stock market crash (Yang and Bessler, 
2008). We employ historical decomposition methodology to identify and quantify 
contributions of all the price series to the change of a certain price series due to animal 
disease outbreaks.   
  
64
 
Historical decomposition expresses equation (4.1) into moving average presentation,  
(4.5) ∑∞
=
−Θ=
0i
ititX ε ,                                                            
where the matrix 0Θ summarizes the contemporaneous causal patterns between 
innovations, and tε  are contemporaneous orthogonal innovations. The price innovations 
estimated from the ECM estimation te  may exhibit off-orthogonal contemporaneous 
correlations. We need to convert te  into the orthogonal innovations tε  before 
conducting historical decomposition.  
(a) Converting to the Orthogonal Contemporaneous Price Innovations 
A structural factorization is employed to covert the innovations from the ECM 
estimation ( et ) into the orthogonal contemporaneous price innovations (ε t ), such that  
(4.6) tt Ae=ε .        
Choleski factorization, as one of the widely used methods, assumes a recursive 
contemporaneous causal structure and considers higher ordered variables as relatively 
more exogenous. As stated by Demiralp and Hoover (2003), one drawback of Choleski 
factorization is that it allows researchers to arbitrarily choose one case among the 
various possible causal stories that may not reflect “true” contemporaneous causal 
ordering among variables.        
Recently, several efforts using directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) are made in VAR-
type model identification (Swanson and Granger, 1997; Spirtes and Scheines, 2000; 
Pearl, 2000; Bessler and Lee, 2002). DAGs are less ad hoc to uncover contemporaneous 
causal orderings that is determined by data itself compared to the arbitrary ordering by 
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the Choleski decomposition. Another advantage of using DAGs is that the results based 
on data can be compared to a priori knowledge of a structural model suggested by 
economic theory or subjective intuition. 
DAG is a picture summarizing causal flows among a set of variables. Arrows 
represent the direction of information flow between variables, but no arrow is allowed to 
direct from one variable all the way back toward itself.  The graph starts with undirected 
edges connecting the variables.  The assignment of the directions to the edges is based 
on the concept of d-separation that is more understandable in the screening-off 
phenomenon (Pearl, 2000). DAGs represent conditional independent relationship as 
implied by the recursive product decomposition: 
(4.7) )|Pr(),.......,,,Pr(
1321 ii
n
in
paxxxxx =Π= ,    
where )Pr(⋅  is the joint probability of variables nxxxx ,.......,,, 321  and ipa  is the 
realization of some subset of the variables that cause ix  in order ),.......,,,( 321 nxxxx .  
We use the greedy equivalent search (GES) algorithm given in Chickering (2002) to 
generate DAGs. The GES algorithm employs a two-stage stepwise search according to 
the Bayesian Information Criterion approximation from Schwarz: 
(4.8) TdGDp k ln
2
),ˆ|(ln D) (G, S −= θ ,   
where p is the probability distribution, θˆ  is the maximum-likelihood estimate of the 
unknown parameters, d is the number of  free parameters of directed acyclic graph G, T 
is the number of observations, and D is the data available to researchers. The scoring 
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criterion considers the trade-off between fit represented by ),ˆ|(ln kGDp θ  and 
parsimony modeled by the term .ln
2
Td  The GES algorithms always moves in the 
direction that increases the Bayesian score the most.  
The algorithm starts with an equivalence class corresponding to no dependencies 
among the variables (no edge between the variables). The GES algorithm follows with a 
two-step procedure consisting of (a) a forward equivalence search for the addition of 
single edges in the first stage where one equivalence class that has the highest increasing 
score among all the possible equivalence classes is chosen for the next stage; and (b) a 
backward equivalence search for the deletion of single edges in the second step where 
the equivalence class that leads to a local maximum is chosen. The two-stage procedure 
is repeated until no further additions or deletions of edges to improve the score. More 
details on the GES algorithms are given in Chickering (2002, p. 520-24)  
(b) Historical Decomposition of Orthogonal Price Innovations 
Once the price innovations from the ECM estimation are converted into the diagonal 
innovations, the historical decomposition of the vector X at particular time t=T+k can be 
divided into two parts: 
(4.9) skT
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sskT
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∞
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+ ∑∑ Θ+Θ= εε 1
0
.     
The first term in the right-hand side of equation (4.9), called the “base projection”, 
utilizes information available up to time period T. The second term contains information 
available from time period T + 1 until T + k including the animal disease outbreaks. The 
base projection that utilizes information available up to time period T is unlikely to 
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coincide with the actual XT+k since additional information from time period T + 1 to T + 
k  that influences the actual XT+k is purposely left out. Therefore, the difference between 
the actual price ( )kTX +  and the base price projection ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ Θ −+
∞
=
∑ skT
ks
sε  is contributed to the 
innovations of all the price series ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ Θ −+
−
=
∑ skTk
s
sε
1
0
. Through the partition, historical 
decomposition allows us to examine the behavior of each price series in the 
neighborhood of important historical events (animal disease outbreaks in our cases) and 
to infer how much each innovation contributes to the unexpected variation of kTX + . 
The Korean Meat Market and Animal Disease Outbreaks 11 
Korean meat market has been continuously expanded along with increasing per capita 
income. The total aggregate production value of the livestock industry is $11.4 billion, 
which accounts for 33.5% of total production value in the Korean agricultural sector in 
2005. The annual per capita meat consumption increased from 20 kilogram in 1990 to 32 
kilogram in 2005, and average food calorie intake from meat increased from 3.7% in 
1980 to 6.8% in 2004.  
After the inception of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, Korea is 
becoming one of the major players in international trade. As of 2003, Korea is the ninth 
largest meat importing country and the fourth largest beef import country in the world. 
In particular, among all the countries that importing meat products from the U.S., Korea 
                                                 
11 All the data mentioned in this section are from an internal report by the Ministry of Agricultural and 
Forest of Korea except that cited from literature.  
  
68
 
is the second largest for beef ($816 million), the fourth for pork ($79 million), and the 
sixth for poultry ($50 million) (Henneberry and Hwang, 2007).  
Korea significantly relies on imports to meet the increasing meat demand. The total 
quantity of imported beef doubled from 1996 to 2003 and the self-sufficiency decreased 
from 53.5% to 36.3% in the same period. Pork consumption constitutes more than half 
of the meat consumption in Korea. The leading pork export countries to Korea are the 
U.S., Chile, Canada, and Belgium. Historically, pork has been highly self-sufficient with 
a sufficiency rate of 80% in 2005. Chicken consumption has been increasing with the 
growing interest in consuming white meat instead of red meat. Korea mainly imports 
chicken from Demark, the U.S., and China.  
To satisfy the growing consumer concern about food safety and quality, the Korea 
government implemented a mandatory “Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points 
(HACCP)” program in meat supply chain in 1997. “Country of Origin (COA)” has been 
brought into the Korea market since 1999. Meanwhile, domestic meat producers and 
retailers have been adopting various market strategies to differentiate their product and 
to meet demand of certain consumer segments including, but not limited to, product 
certificate programs and branding.  
Since Korea exhibits significant import dependence, it takes on risk from animal 
disease outbreaks in exporting countries in additional to domestic incidents. The Korean 
meat market has faced several significant animal diseases outbreaks that have occurred 
in or out of the country and caused disruptions in the meat market since 2000. The 
largest outbreak case of FMD in Korea was discovered in a dairy cow farm in Paju 
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county, Kyonggi province, north of Seoul on March 25, 2000. Fourteen more FMD 
infected cases in Chungnam and Chungbuk provinces were reported on a dairy farm and 
a domestic high quality cattle (Hanwoo) farm in April 2000. Korean National Veterinary 
Research and Quarantine Service restricted the movement of all animals and animal 
related products within a 20 kilometers radius of the outbreak farms to avoid further 
spread of FMD. As a result, a total of 2,216 head of livestock (cow, hog, and lamb) were 
slaughtered by the end of April, 2000; the estimated total direct cost amounts to $404 
million; the Korea government spent more than $7 million to compensate for livestock 
loss and purchase back the overstocked pork to protect farmers. In response, Japan 
imposed an import ban of a total of 80,265 metric tons of pork from Korea.  
The first AI case was reported in a Korean native chicken farm in Umsong county, 
Chungbuk province on December 10, 2003, followed by eighteen more AI cases 
diagnosed nation wide. As contagious as FMD, AI imposes a threat to humans while 
FMD does not typically affect humans. As a result of the AI incidents 5,283,493 head of 
poultry (mainly chicken) were slaughtered along with vaccination and movement 
restriction of animals and humans in the affected zones. Chicken consumption fell down 
by 30%. The estimated total direct cost is over $137 million.  
In contrast with the AI and FMD outbreaks, BSE has not been discovered in Korea. 
However, the U.S. is the largest country that exports beef to Korea. In 2003, beef 
imported from the U.S. accounted for 68% of the total beef imported and 44% of the 
total beef consumption in Korea. Generally, animal disease outbreaks overseas affect the 
domestic meat market in two ways: (a) loss of consumer confidence that decreases the 
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consumption of imported meat but may increase the demand for disease free domestic 
meat; and (b) trade disruptions that lead to the change on the supply side. Following the 
US BSE discovery in December 2003, Korea banned imports of beef and offal from the 
U.S.,12 and Australia became the largest beef importing country accounting for over 75% 
of beef imports since 2004. Beef consumption in Korea dropped by 16% in response to 
simultaneous reduction of beef demand and supply. The consumption of imported beef 
fell by 27% in 2004 due to consumer concern over food safety and fell more in 2005. In 
contrast, domestic beef consumption has had little change, and rather slightly increased 
in the same period. Meanwhile, the pork imports had a substantial increase of 185% 
from 2003 to 2005, which suggests a significant substitution to pork.  
Data 
The data used in this study are monthly Korean meat prices of beef, pork, and chicken at 
the retail, wholesale, and farm levels from January 1985 to December 2006.  Data are 
retail beef price (RB), wholesale beef price (WB), farm beef price (FB), retail pork price 
(RP), wholesale pork price (WP), farm pork price (FP), retail chicken price (RC), 
wholesale chicken price (WC), and farm chicken price (FC). All series are provided by 
Korea Agro-Fisheries Trade Corporation (KAFTC). Figure 4.1 plots these nine monthly 
price series. The retail prices of beef and pork have a clear upward trend since 1999, 
while the prices at the wholesale and farm levels are relatively stable.  
                                                 
12 The import ban has not been lifted until July, 2007. Starting from July, 2007, boneless beef is allowed to 
import from the U.S. to Korean.   
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Empirical Findings and Discussion 
Before we conduct the ECM estimation we test for non-stationarity of each price series 
using Dickey Fuller (DF) tests and Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests. For the ADF 
test, the optimal lag length was determined by minimizing Schwarz-loss information 
metric. The results in Table 4.1 suggest that all the price series, except the chicken prices 
at the farm and wholesale level (FC and WP) and the wholesale pork price (WP), are 
non-stationary at the 5% significance level. However, the first order difference of each 
price series is stationary.  
As we discussed in above section, we can either use the two-step procedure to 
determine the optimal lag length (k) and the rank of cointegration vectors (r) separately 
using system-based LR tests, or use the one-step procedure to jointly determine k and r 
using information criteria metrics. As shown in Table 4.2, SIC, HQ, and HJ metrics 
suggest a level VAR with two lags, while AIC metrics suggests three lags. Since the 
optimal lag length determined by HQ metrics through the parsimony principle is two and 
further SIC may have tendency to over-penalize additional regressors in contrast to other 
metrics (Geweke and Meese, 1981), we conclude a level VAR with two lags, which 
corresponds to one lagged difference in the ECM estimation, i.e., k = 2 in equation (1). 
The trace test results in Table 4.3 show that we reject the null hypothesis at r=0, 1≤r , 
and 2≤r at the 1% significance level and fail to reject the null hypothesis 3≤r  at the 
5% significance level for both specifications (with or without linear trend). The test 
results suggest that three cointegrating vectors exist in the cointegrating space. 
Following the one-step procedure, we conclude that the optimal lag length is two and the 
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rank of cointegrating vectors is three since this combination gives the lowest HQ loss 
metric (see Figure 4.2). Therefore, the optimal lag length and the rank of cointegration 
vectors are the same using these two procedures, which is consistent with Wang and 
Bessler’s finding (2005).  
Since the possible structural change will affect the performance of forecasting, we 
implement trace tests based on time-varying rolling cointegration methods for any 
structural changes. The results of normalized trace tests suggest a significant structural 
change occurred in 2000 that is likely induced by the 2000 FMD outbreak.   
The Impacts of Animal Disease Outbreaks on Korean Meat Prices 
Since the domestic FMD outbreak occurred in April 2000, we first estimate ECM using 
the information from January 1985 to March 2000 and then conduct out-of-sample 
forecasting of meat prices of 44 months after the event before the next animal disease 
outbreak occurred, i.e., from April 2000 to November 2003.13  
We use the same procedure to conduct forecasting of meat pries of 36 months after 
the domestic AI incidents and the U.S. BSE discovery in December 2003, i.e., from 
January 2004 to December 2006. In terms of what information to use for the estimation 
and forecasting relating to the AI/BSE events, we have two options: (a) using a large 
sample consisting of the information from January 1985 to November 2003 despite of 
the structural change induced by the FMD outbreak in April 2000; and (b) using a small 
                                                 
13 Forecasting can be conducted either in-sample using the entire sample or out-of-sample obtained from a 
sequence of recursive or rolling regressions. In general out-of-sample forecasting has a better performance 
than in-sample forecasting, the latter being biased in favor of detecting spurious predictability (Ashley et 
al., 1980). Meanwhile, moving average parameters, Θ, for base projection and contribution in equation (9) 
associated with historical decomposition are fitted by in-sample procedure as programmed in RATS. 
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sample including the information after the FMD outbreak, i.e. from May 2000 to 
November 2003, to avoid the impacts of the structure change. We then conduct forecast 
performance tests between the two options. The results of mean square forecasting error 
(MSFE) report that the large sample model has a lower MSFE than the small sample 
model in all horizons except for farm beef in the three-month horizon, farm pork and 
wholesale pork in the five-month horizon, and retail pork (RP) in three to the five-month 
horizon. To investigate the statistical difference between these two forecasting errors, we 
employ modified Diebold-Mariano test (Harvey et. al, 1997) at one-step ahead forecast. 
The null hypothesis is that the means squared errors between the large and small sample 
ECM models are the same. The t-statistics of the DM tests are 2.525 (FB), 2.014 (FP), 
2.427 (FC), 2.015 (WB), 1.014 (WP), 1.832 (WC), 2.240 (RB), 2.182 (RP), 2.135 (RC), 
which are greater than the critical value of Student t-distribution with degree of freedom 
of 36 at the 5% significance level (1.690). Hence, we reject the null hypotheses at the 
5% significance level in all cases except wholesale pork price (WP). We then conclude 
that the large sample ECM model gives a better forecast despite of the structural change 
induced by the domestic FMD in April 2000. Thus, we choose the large sample ECM 
model.  
We denote by xdij  and F dij  the actual and forecasted meat prices, where i indicates 
meat type, j indicates the farm ( j=f ), wholesale ( j=w ), and retail ( j=r ) levels, and d 
indicates disease type, either the 2000 FMD outbreak (d = FMD) or the 2003 AI/BSE 
incidents (d = AB). We then construct the percent change of the actual price relative to 
the forecasted price,  
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(a) The Impacts of the Domestic FMD Outbreak on Meat Prices 
Figure 4.3 illustrates P FMDijΔ over time for beef, pork, and chicken at the farm, 
wholesale, and retail levels following the domestic FMD outbreak in April 2000. Figures 
4.3a and 4.3b suggests that the FMD outbreak had negative effects on the beef and pork 
markets. The beef and pork prices decreased in the short run. The retail price rebounded 
earlier than the farm and wholesale price. However, the magnitude and timing of the 
changes were different in these two markets. The initial price decreases in the first seven 
months after the event were more dramatic in the pork market than in the beef market 
(up to 40% for the farm pork price and 13% for the farm beef price, and up to 38% for 
the wholesale pork price and 4% for the wholesale beef price). The retail beef price 
recovered eight months after the event, but the price recovery at the farm and whole 
levels were almost six months behind. Overall, the beef market appeared to have 
recovered 16 months after the event. Figure 4.3b suggests that the 2000 FMD outbreak 
had long term adverse impacts on the farm and wholesale pork prices -- the prices did 
not recover for over 44 months after the disease outbreak. The long run impacts on the 
farm and wholesale price may due to the disruption on the production cycles. 
In contrast to beef and pork prices, chicken, as a substitute of beef and pork, 
benefited from the outbreak and its prices increased up to 34% for the farm and 
wholesale prices and up to 10% for the retail prices between the second and the eighth 
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month. However, the substitution seems not to be permanent since the chicken prices 
went down after the beef and pork markets rebounded.  
(b) The Impacts of the AI/BSE Incidents in December 2003 on Meat Prices    
Figure 4.4 illustrates the percentage change of price, P ABijΔ , for beef, pork, and chicken 
at the farm, wholesale, and retail levels following the 2003 Korean AI and the U.S. BSE 
events.  
Immediately after the BSE discovery in the U.S., Korea banned beef import from the 
U.S., which caused the total imported beef to drop by 71% in January 2004 compared to 
the previous year. The import ban may have lead to a demand increase for domestic 
produced beef, which may have increased the prices of domestic produced beef. On the 
other hand, consumers have been reluctant to consume beef, since they may have not felt 
secure about beef, regardless of whether it was imported or domestically produced. As of 
January 2004, the consumption of domestic beef fell by 37.2%, and retail beef price 
dropped by 4.7% over the previous year in Korea. As shown in Figure 4.4a, the retail 
beef price decreased by 10% in the 10th month, which suggests that the impact on the 
demand side dominates. The concern over the safety beef consumption among 
consumers might be one of the main factors that caused a substantial decrease in prices 
of domestic produced beef, even though the BSE discovery did not occur in Korea. 
However, the retail beef price rebounded and recovered 13 months after the incidents. 
Figure 4.4a also shows an immediate, sharp price drop at the farm and wholesale levels 
following the animal disease incidents. The farm and wholesale beef prices decreased by 
28% in the sixth month after the incidents and, then, the wholesale beef rebounded and 
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eventually recovered 14 months after the incidents. But the farm beef price did not fully 
recover even three years after the incidents.  
Figure 4.4c shows that chicken prices rebounded shortly following a substantial, 
immediate price fall after the incidents. The recovery of chicken prices in a short period 
from the AI shock may be contributed to the promotion campaign of chicken 
consumption and reopened trade of heated chicken meat products in July 2004 as well as 
the substitution of beef with chicken due to the US BSE discovery. Figure 4.4b clearly 
shows that the pork market gained from the incidents as the prices increased, which may 
be contributed to consumption substitution.  
(c) Differentiating Impacts between Two Incidents in 2000 and 20003 
Both FMD and BSE directly affect the Korean beef market as cattle are vulnerable to 
both diseases. If we compare Figures 4.3 and 4.4, we note that the impact of the 2003 
BSE outbreak occurred in the oversea market was greater than that of the 2000 FMD 
outbreak in Korea. First, the initial beef price drop at the farm, wholesale, and retail 
levels within the first six months was much bigger following the BSE discovery than the 
FMD outbreak. Second, the price recovery came earlier in the BSE case (approximately 
13 months after the event for the BSE case and 16 months for the FMD case). The farm 
beef price did not recover to the pre-event level after the BSE discovery.  
FMD directly affects the pork market. Pork prices decreased following the FMD 
outbreak and the farm and wholesale pork prices did not recover in the three years after 
the event. The presence of the long term adverse impact of the 2000 FMD outbreak at 
the farm and wholesale level may due to the disruptions to animal production cycles 
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caused by mass slaughter. However, the BSE incident affected the pork market through 
consumption substitution, and pork prices increased following the 2003 BSE and AI 
incidents.  
The Impacts of Animal Disease Outbreaks on Price Margins 
The question addressed here is whether and by how much animal disease outbreaks 
increase or decrease the price margin along the supply chain. The retail-to-farm price 
margin PM d rfi,  that is affected by animal disease outbreak d is xx
d
if
d
ir − , and it is 
FF difdir −  if there is no disease outbreak. Therefore, the change of the retail-to-farm price 
margin due to animal disease outbreak d is written in equation (4.11.a). Similarly, the 
change of the wholesale-to-farm and the retail-to-wholesale price margin are in 
equations (4.11.b) and (4.11.c), respectively. 
(4.11.a) ( ) ( )FFxxPM difdirdifdird rfi −−−=, , retail-to-farm     
(4.11.b) ( ) ( )FFxxPM difdiwdifdiwd wfi −−−=, , wholesale-to-farm   
(4.11.c) ( ) ( )FFxxPM diwdirdiwdird rwi −−−=, .  retail-to-wholesale   
An animal disease outbreak widens the price margin at level l relative to level m if 
0, >PM dlmi , narrows the price margin if 0, <PM dlmi , or has no effect on the price 
margin.  
(a) The Impacts of the 2000 FMD Outbreak on Price Margins 
Figure 4.5 shows the change in the price margins resulting from the FMD outbreak in 
April 2000. The results suggest that the price margins along the supply chain stayed 
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almost constant for six month after the FMD outbreak for beef or three months for pork. 
After this period, the price margin at the retail level relative to the farm and wholesale 
levels started to increase. This finding suggests that retailers may actually gain from the 
disease outbreak, which is consistent with Lloyd et al. (2006) and Sanjuan and Dawson 
(2003). As discussed by Lloyd et al. (2006), the fact that retailers may gain from disease 
outbreaks may be contributed to the market power in the retail level. According to the 
Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS), there are approximately 250 stores in 
Korea that have 100 employees and up, and these stores are owned only by five 
companies (Shinsegae E-mart, Lotte mart, Carrefour, Samsung Home-Plus, Wal-Mart 14). 
The sales of these stores account for approximately one third of total sales in the retail 
market. Indeed, the retail market in general is highly concentrated in Korea, and retailers 
may use their market power to gain from the disease outbreaks.   
(b) The Impacts of the 2003 AI/BSE Incidents on Price Margins 
Following the AI/BSE incidents consumers may substitute beef and chicken with pork 
and, hence, the price margin at the retail level relative to the farm and wholesale levels 
increased while there was almost no change between the wholesale and farm levels in 
the pork market. In the beef market the incidents did not change the price margin at the 
retail level relative to the farm or wholesale level in the first four months after the animal 
disease incidents. The price margin then decreased, and finally increased starting from 
the 13th month after the incidents (at which the beef prices started to rebound).  
                                                 
14 As of May 2005, Wal-Mart phased out in the Korean market  
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The Impacts of Animal Disease Outbreaks on Dynamic Price Interdependence  
The analysis so far did not say anything about the change in interdependence among 
price series due to animal disease outbreaks. We employ historical decomposition to 
evaluate how much each price innovation accounts for the atypical variation of a certain 
price series due to animal disease shocks.  
The contemporaneous correlation matrix of price innovations estimated from the 
ECM in Figure 4.7 shows positive correlations between innovations of any two price 
series except FB and FP, FB and WP, WB and FC, WB and WC, WB and RC. We also 
find strong correlations between prices in the pork or chicken market, suggesting that 
innovations in the pork or chicken market quickly transmitted into other levels within the 
supply chain. However, the beef market had relatively weak correlations along the 
supply chain.  
Using the correlation matrix in Figure 4.7, we employ TETRAD IV with the GES 
algorithm to identify the causal flows between contemporaneous price innovations.15 
The results in Figure 4.8 suggest the innovations of the farm level prices directly 
affected the wholesale prices in three meat markets. The innovation of the chicken price 
at the farm level also directly affected its price at the retail level. The retail pork price 
played an important role in the pork market since it directly or indirectly affected the 
farm and wholesale pork prices. The beef price in the farm and wholesale levels did not 
directly affect the retail beef price, but affected the retail price through the price series of 
pork and chicken.   
                                                 
15 TETRAD IV available at http://www.phil.cmu.edu/projects/tetrad. 
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Historical decomposition of each series is implemented over 23 months, including 
two months before each event, the month the incident occurred, and 20 months 
following the event. The bar chart in Figure 4.9 illustrates the contribution of each price 
series, either negative or positive, to the abnormal change in the retail beef price 
responding to either the 2000 FMD outbreak or the 2003 AI/BSE incidents. The 
deviation of the actual meat price relative to the base projection, which is represented by 
the solid line, shows that the 2003 AI/BSE incidents had greater impacts on the retail 
beef price than the 2000 FMD outbreak in terms of larger price decrease and longer 
recovery periods. Figure 4.9a shows that in the first six months after the event, the farm 
beef price innovation explained the majority of the retail beef price innovation. However, 
after six months, the contribution of farm beef price was diminishing and was being 
replaced by the contributions from the retail beef, retail pork, and farm chicken price. 
This is reasonable since the supply shock occurred in first as the Korean government 
slaughtered infected cattle immediately after the event. Figure 4.9b shows that the farm 
beef price innovation had a significant negative contribution to the retail beef price 
innovation, followed by the wholesale chicken price following the 2003 AI/BSE 
incidents. The basic message of Figure 4.9 is that the significance of the contribution 
from each price innovation changed over time following the disease outbreak, which 
may suggest that the interdependence structure within the meat system changed as well.  
Similar figures of historical decomposition are available upon request. We also have 
the following findings based on the historical decomposition of other price innovations. 
First, the variation of the farm price was mainly due to the shocks of its own price, and 
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the other innovations had minimal influences on the farm price under both animal 
disease outbreaks. Second, in the case of the AI/BSE incidents, price variation at the 
wholesale level was mainly attributed to the innovation of the farm price, and the 
contribution of the wholesale price innovation itself was relatively small. While in the 
case of the 2000 FMD outbreak, the wholesale pork price almost solely contributed to its 
upward pressure. Third, farm prices played a dominant role in explaining the variation of 
the retail prices in both outbreaks except for the retail beef and pork prices after the 2000 
FMD outbreak.  
Conclusions 
Employing time series methods, mainly the error correction model and historical 
decomposition of price innovation, accompanied by directed acyclic graphs, we identify 
and quantify the impacts of domestic (FMD and AI) or overseas (BSE) animal disease 
crises on the Korean meat supply chain using monthly prices of beef, pork, and chicken 
at farm, wholesale, and retail level from January, 1985 to December, 2006.  
Overall, the domestic FMD outbreak in April 2000 induced a significant structural 
change in the Korean meat price system. However, the domestic AI incidents and the 
U.S. BSE discovery in December 2003 did not lead to any significant structural change. 
We summarize the main findings of the impacts of the domestic and oversea animal 
disease outbreaks on prices, price margins along the supply chain, and price 
interdependences in the Korean meat system below.  
First, we find that animal disease outbreaks caused a temporary price shock to the 
Korean meat market regardless of whether it is overseas or domestic and regardless of 
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disease type (FMD, AI, or BSE). However, the market rebounded and eventually partly 
or fully recovered. The adverse impacts of the 2000 FMD outbreak dissipated and finally 
partly recovered over the next 16 months, and over the next 13 months for the AI/BSE 
incidents. Exceptions are that the wholesale and farm pork prices in the case of the 2000 
FMD outbreak and the farm beef price in the case of the 2003 AI/BSE incidents stayed 
lower than the pre-event level for more than three years, which may be contributed to the 
supply disruptions. Furthermore, the AI/BSE incidents led to more significant changes in 
beef prices in the first six shock periods compared with the FMD outbreak. The pork 
market gained from the AI/BSE incidents due to consumption substitution, but the gain 
was short-lived.  
Second, we find that the retail price recovered ahead of other prices and the retail 
price margin relative to the wholesale and farm levels became wider despite the initial 
price drop at the retail level. Given the concentrated retail market in Korea, these results 
imply that exogenous shocks like animal disease outbreaks can influence the price 
margin along the supply chain when market power exists as suggested by Lloyd et al. 
(2006). In addition, we discover that the wholesale-to-farm price margin was relatively 
stable. Therefore, the analysis on price margin indicates that both animal disease 
outbreaks triggered asymmetric price transmission in the Korean meat supply chain and 
the retail sector had a windfall price gain.   
Third, we identify the interdependence among the price series and its change when 
facing animal disease outbreaks using historical decomposition of price innovations. The 
results suggest that the farm level price innovation has played a major role in explaining 
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the innovations of the wholesale and retail prices in each market. Right after the disease 
outbreaks, there was a shortage in the beef supply in the Korean beef market either 
because the Korean government slaughtered infected cattle after the FMD outbreak or 
banned the imports from the U.S. after the BSE discovery. This fact may explain the 
finding that the retail beef price innovation was explained mainly by the farm level beef 
price in the first few months after the event. But the contribution of the farm beef price 
dissipated and eventually was dominated by other price series in the long term.  
 This study makes the following contributions to the literature on the impact of 
animal disease outbreaks. First, we consider multiple animal disease outbreaks of 
different disease types (AI, BSE, FMD) with different country of origin (domestic versus 
oversea). Hence, we are able to investigate differentiated impacts. Second, to our 
knowledge, this study is the first that simultaneously investigates the impacts of animal 
disease outbreaks on meat prices, price margins along the supply chain, and price 
interdependence in meat system. It provides a broader understanding of the impacts of 
disease outbreaks. Third, the majority of literature that investigates impacts of animal 
disease outbreaks on meat markets focuses on the U.S., Canada, Europe, and Japan 
markets. To our knowledge there is no study that systematically investigates the Korean 
meat market.  
We only considered domestic prices in the meat supply chain because of the lack of 
data on imported meat price. Hence, the currently available data does not allow us to 
explain the role of imported meat price in the Korean market. Secondly, animal disease 
outbreaks cause supply disruptions, for example, a mass slaughter of cattle in the even of 
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an FMD outbreak. However, we do not have quantity data, which eliminates the 
possibility to directly incorporate the impact of the supply shock in the meat demand 
system. A more broad system including imported meat price as well as quantity along 
the supply chain should be analyzed to have a more complete understanding of the 
impacts of animal disease outbreaks, which can be the direction for future research. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation uses empirical time series methods and a game theory based model to 
investigate the meat supply chain of two counties.  Causal and dynamic relationships 
among variables in the U.S. cattle supply chain are investigated. Motives for packer use 
of contract procurement are identified.  And impacts of animal disease outbreaks on the 
Korean meat supply chain are investigated. 
The first objective of this study is to investigate causal relationships among variables 
in the U.S. cattle supply chain to enhance understanding of the U.S. cattle sector. Based 
on time-varying trace test results and the knowledge of historical events in the U.S. 
cattle supply chain, we identify two significant regime changes corresponding to the 
1996 grain shock and the 2001 Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting Act (LMPR) 
during the study time horizon (1988-2005). Granger temporal causality test results 
suggest the overall temporal causality in the U.S. cattle supply chain becomes weak after 
the structural change though relatively strong causalities are found in pre-break periods. 
More extensive contemporaneous causal relationships are found in post-break periods. 
Both causality test results shows that captive supply directly causes fed cattle spot prices 
in post-break periods but has only indirect impacts in pre-break periods. The causal 
relationship between captive supply and fed cattle spot prices strongly supports the 
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argument that “the use of non-cash procurement leads to pressure on the spot market 
price” in several previous empirical works.  
The second objective is to develop a dynamic game theoretic framework to 
investigate the incentives for, and the dynamic effects of, contract and spot market cattle 
procurement by packers. To examine the effect on spot price under the coexistence of 
spot and contract markets in the cattle industry a game-theoretic model is developed. A 
duopsony scenario with two packers and N feeders is used to reflect the reality in the 
cattle industry. An important contribution is to incorporate the feeder risk and hedonic 
pricing of cattle quality attributes that result form feeder effort in the model. Results 
show that packers have an incentive to maintain contract and spot market purchase as a 
means to exercising price discrimination between markets and that risk adverse feeders 
and quality attributes alone cannot explain the price differentials generated in 
equilibrium. The results may shed light on understanding potential effects of captive 
supplies on market power and may aid in the assessment of the policies designed to 
enhance competition in the cattle industry. 
The final objective is to investigate the impacts of animal disease outbreaks on the 
Korean meat market, price margins along the supply chain, and price interdependence in 
the meat supply chain. Results indicate that animal disease outbreaks caused a temporary 
price shock to the Korean meat market regardless of whether it originated overseas or in 
the domestic market and regardless of disease type (FMD, AI, or BSE). In addition, 
retailers likely to have windfall profits as the retail price margin in creased relative to the 
farm and wholesale levels. This is because retail market in general is highly concentrated 
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in Korea. Given the concentrated retail market in Korea, our results imply that 
exogenous shocks like animal disease outbreaks can influence the price margin along the 
supply chain when market power exists.  While, we discover that the wholesale-to-farm 
price margin was relatively stable. The results from historical decomposition of price 
innovations suggest that the farm level price innovation has played a major role in 
explaining the innovations of the wholesale and retail prices in each market.  
This dissertation has some limitations. In chapter II, we analyze causal relationship 
of two sub-periods based on structural break tests although both trace tests suggest at 
least two significant break points. Due to the degrees of freedom problem, however, only 
a single significant break point is chosen. With more observations, it would be 
interesting to explore more reliable causal relationships. In addition, Sup-LM or Sup-LR 
test developed by Andrews (1993) can be considered as an alternative methodology to 
examine structural breaks.  
In chapter III, we imposed the symmetric conditions in both spot and contract market. 
The symmetric condition, however, is too strict to investigate more precise and real 
market characteristics.  An analysis of welfare effects on market participants is not 
conducted in this chapter.  
In chapter IV, we only considered domestic prices in the meat supply chain because 
of lack of data on imported meat price. Hence, the currently available data does not 
allow us to explain the role of imported meat prices on the Korean market. Secondly, 
animal disease outbreaks cause supply disruptions, for example, a mass slaughter of 
cattle in the even of an FMD outbreak. However, we do not have quantity data, which 
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eliminates the possibility to directly incorporate the impact of a supply shock in the meat 
demand system. A more broad system including imported meat price as well as quantity 
along the supply chain should be analyzed to have a more complete understanding of the 
impacts of animal disease outbreaks, which can be the direction for future research. 
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APPENDIX A 
NOMENCLATURE 
 
BOXP Boxed Beef Price 
CAPT Captive Supply 
CORP Corn Price 
FB Farm Beef  
FC Farm Chicken  
FP Farm Pork  
FEDP Feeder Cattle Price 
FEEP Fed Cattle Spot Price 
FUTP Fed Cattle Futures Price 
HHI Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index  
INVT Cattle Inventory 
RB Retail Beef  
RC Retail Chicken  
RP Retail Pork  
REBP Retail Beef Price 
WB Wholesale Beef  
WC Wholesale Chicken  
WP Wholesale Pork  
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APPENDIX B 
FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1.  Overview of beef production segments in the U.S. cattle supply chain 
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Figure 2.2.  Nine important variables along the U.S. cattle supply chain  
(1988: 01 – 2005: 08) 
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Figure 2.3.  Normalized trace tests based on the rolling cointegration vectors 
(y-axis is the normalized test statistics) 
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Figure 2.4.  Normalized trace tests based on the recursive cointegration vectors 
(y-axis is the normalized test statistics) 
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(2) Explained by cattle inventory 
 
Figure 2.5. Recursive forecast error variance decomposition at the 12-month 
horizon (solid lines) and 24-month horizon (dashed lines) 
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(1) Impulse response to captive supply 
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(2) Impulse response to cattle inventory 
 
Figure 2.6. Recursive impulse response functions at the 12-month horizon (solid 
lines) and 24-month horizon (dashed lines) 
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Figure 2.7.  Out-of-sample temporal Granger causality 
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Figure 2.8.  Contemporaneous DAGs causality 
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Figure 3.1. Actions and choices variable in the stage game 
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(a) 1st F.O.C 
 
(b) 2nd F.O.C 
 
Figure 3.2. Numerical results for first order condition 
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Figure 3.3. Numerical results for optimal β and S 
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(a) Beef 
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(b) Pork 
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(c) Chicken  
 
Figure 4.1. Monthly prices of beef, pork, and chicken at the farm, wholesale,  
and retail levels (January 1985 -- December 2006) 
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Figure 4.2. Hannan and Quinn (HQ) loss given different combinations of 
cointegration ranks (r) and lag length (k) 
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(a) Beef 
 
(b) Pork 
 
(c) Chicken 
Figure 4.3. Percentage change of the actual price relative to the forecasted price 
following the FMD outbreak in April 2000 and before the AI/BSE incidents in 
December 2003 (The x-axis is the number of months after the 2000 FMD outbreak) 
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(a) Beef 
 
(b) Pork 
 
(c) Chicken  
Figure 4.4. Percentage change of the actual price relative to the forecasted price 
following the AI/BSE incidents in December 2003 (The x-axis is the number of 
months after the incidents) 
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(a) Beef 
 
(b) Pork 
 
(c) Chicken 
Figure 4.5. Changes in the price margin along the supply chain following the FMD 
outbreak in April 2000 and before the BSE/AI incidents in December 2003  
(The x-axis is the number of month after the event) 
  
113
 
 
(a) Beef 
 
(b) Pork 
 
(c) Chicken 
 
Figure 4.6. Change in the price margin along the supply chain following the AI/BS 
incidents in December 2003 (The x-axis is the number of months after the incidents) 
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                  FB         FP          FC      WB        WP       WC       RB        RP       RC    
RC
RP
RB
WC
WP
WB
FC
FP
FB
  
1.000    0.246    0.094    0.691    0.083     0.025-    0.798     0.106     0.024  
1.000     0.172    0.154    0.315     0.170     0.167     0.373     0.056  
1.000    0.036    0.075     0.071     0.085     0.097     0.109  
1.000    0.056     0.059-   0.883     0.062     0.048  
1.000     0.044     0.074     0.944     0.018-
1.00     0.011-   0.027     0.572  
1.000     0.064     0.065  
1.000     0.049-
1.000  
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Figure 4.7. Correlation matrix of the innovations ( ê ) estimated from the ECM 
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Figure 4.8. DAG results based on the GES algorithm 
Retail chicken 
price  
Retail pork 
price 
Retail beef 
price 
Farm chicken 
price 
Farm pork 
price 
Farm beef 
price 
Wholesale 
chicken price 
Wholesale 
pork price 
Wholesale beef 
price 
  
116
 
 
(a) Responding to the 2000 FMD outbreak 
 
 
(b) Responding to 2003 AI/BSE incidents 
 
Figure 4.9. Contribution of each price series on the innovation of retail beef price 
when responding to the animal disease outbreaks (Each stacked bar illustrates positive or 
negative contribution of nine price series to the innovation of retail beef price. The solid line represents the 
deviation of the actual retail beef price from the base projection. The x-axis is the number of months 
before the event and after the event while the event occurred in month zero) 
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APPENDIX C 
TABLES 
 
Table 2.1. Contemporaneous Innovation Correlation Matrix 
 
Pre-Break Periods 
                                CAPT    INVT    FEEP    FEDP    BOXP    REBP    FUTP    CORP    HHI 
HHI
CORP
FUTP
REBP
BOXP
FEDP
FEEP
INVT
CAPT
  
1.000    0.048     0.005     0.048-   0.050      0.093     0.030-   0.427-   0.022-
1.000     0.110-   0.093     0.190-    0.287-   0.287-   0.133-   0.070  
1.000     0.028     0.420      0.561     0.333     0.222-   0.172-
1.000     0.054      0.021     0.068-   0.083-   0.033-
1.000      0.871    0.567     0.205-   0.287-
1.000     0.543     0.255-   0.298-
1.000     0.177     0.100-
1.000     0.086-
1.000  
1 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
=Ω
 
 
Post-Break Periods 
                                CAPT    INVT    FEEP    FEDP    BOXP    REBP    FUTP    CORP    HHI 
HHI
CORP
FUTP
REBP
BOXP
FEDP
FEEP
INVT
CAPT
  
1.000   0.095-   0.228   0.004    0.176    0.148    0.320    0.232    0.025  
 1.000    0.128    0.043-  0.038-  0.114   0.187-  0.247-  0.116-
 1.000    0.445    0.355    0.521    0.246   0.174-  0.157-
 1.000    0.053    0.114   0.062-  0.184-  0.004  
1.000    0.772    0.289   0.332 -  0.027-
1.000    0.328   0.335-  0.259-
 1.000   0.235    0.118  
 1.000    0.058-
 1.000  
2 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
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⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
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⎜
⎝
⎛
=Ω
 
 
  
118
 
Table 2.2. Out-of-Sample Temporal Granger Causality Test 
Pre-break periods 
  CAPT INVT FEEP FEDP BOXP REBP FUTP CORP HHI 
CAPT – 0.474**  0.752**  0.535**    
INVT  –  -0.755 -0.796    0.499**
FEEP 0.742**  – -0.678 -0.751  -1.945 -1.464  
FEDP  -0.850 -0.504 –  -1.511   0.039 
BOXP  -0.623 -0.365  – -0.623 -1.369 0.66  
REBP    -1.169 -1.223 –    
FUTP 1.341**  -0.309 1.650** -0.306 0.568** – 0.126 0.0143 
CORP 0.695** 0.810** -0.506     –  
HHI        0.885** – 
          
Post-break periods 
  CAPT INVT FEEP FEDP BOXP REBP FUTP CORP HHI 
CAPT –         
INVT 0.041 –  0.097*   -0.101 -0.060  
FEEP  -0.051 –  -0.186  0.033   
FEDP 0.332* -0.047 0.325* –  -0.006  -0.009 0.020 
BOXP 0.002 -0.144  0.008 – -0.034  -0.005 0.016 
REBP 0.065  -0.069  0.153* –  -0.025 0.009 
FUTP   0.129* 0.164*   –   
CORP        –  
HHI         – 
Note: No entry on any off-diagonal cell represents cases that an unrestricted model has a larger MSFE 
than a restricted model. The null hypothesis is that each series in the first row does not Granger cause any 
particular series in the first column. The critical values (MSE-T test) of DM test given in Clark and 
McCracken (2001), corresponding to 92 =k (the number of variables in the unrestricted model), and 
6.0/ == RPπ  where P is the number of forecasts and R is base sample period to calculate the first 
forecast, are 0.397 at the 95% confidence level and 0.096 at 90% confidence level. Asterisks, **and *, 
indicate that the null is rejected at the 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 3.1. Comparative Static Results: Spot Market 
 ( )skWE  sX  ssk xx =    for any k 
ss
k ee =    
for any k 
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Table 3.2. Comparative Static Results: Contract Market 
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Table 4.1. Tests for Non-Stationarity of Monthly Meat Price Series 
Meat price series Dickey Fuller Test Augmented Dickey Fuller Test 
Level Difference Level Difference 
Beef     
Farm  -1.31 -9.06** -2.36 (1) -9.96(5)** 
Wholesale  -1.38 -14.29** -1.38 (1) -10.59 (1)** 
Retail  0.75 -9.23** -0.29 (1) -9.13 (1)** 
Pork     
Farm  -2.65 -11.92** -2.70 (2) -13.86(1)** 
Wholesale  -3.47* -13.26** -3.34(2)* -14.02 (1)** 
Retail  1.14 -11.37** 0.90 (2) -11.80 (1)** 
Chicken     
Farm  -6.58** -16.84** -6.73 (1)** -13.07(2)** 
Wholesale  -5.74** -16.82** -5.83(1)** -12.71(3)** 
Retail  -2.17 -15.80** -1.73 (2) -14.59 (1)** 
Note: The asterisks, * and **, indicate 5% and 1% significance level. The critical value is -2.89 at the 5% 
significance level and -3.51 at the 1% level. Schwarz information criterion, SIC = 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+Ω
T
Tkk
ln)ˆln(det ,  is applied to determine the number of lags that is listed in parentheses when we 
conduct ADF tests, where kΩˆ is the maximum likelihood estimate of variance-covariance matrix of Ω , T 
is the sample size, and k is the lag length. 
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Table 4.2. Optimal Lag Length of a Level VAR 
Lag 
Schwarz information 
Criterion (SIC) 
Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) 
Hannan and 
Quinn (HQ) 
Hacker and 
Hatemin-J (HJ) 
0 111.30 111.10 111.22 111.25 
1 95.57 93.67 94.90 95.20 
2 95.40 92.76 94.12 94.69 
3 96.52 92.14 94.62 95.47 
4 97.77 92.65 95.26 96.39 
5 99.07 93.19 95.94 97.35 
6 100.26 92.61 96.52 98.20 
Note: Information criteria metrics used to identify the optimal lag length (k) of a level VAR are  
SIC = ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+Ω
T
Tnkk
ln)ˆln(det ; AIC = ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+Ω
T
nkk
2)ˆln(det ;HQ = ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+Ω
T
Tnkk
)ln(ln2)ˆln(det ; 
and HJ = ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++Ω
T
TnTnkk
)ln(ln2ln)ˆln(det ;where kΩˆ is the maximum likelihood estimate of 
variance-covariance matrix of Ω , k is the proposed lag length, n is the number of variables, and T is the 
sample size. 
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Table 4.3. Trace Tests for ECM under Two Specifications of  Deterministic   
                  Term 
Rank 
 
Without linear trend With linear trend 
Trace 
statistics 
Critical value Test 
decision
Trace 
statistics
Critical value Test 
decision1% 5% 1% 5% 
r = 0 297.54 220.99 208.27 R 287.50 209.58 197.22 R 
r = 1 212.27 180.95 169.41 R 204.63 170.5 159.32 R 
r = 2 139.09 144.91 134.54 R 131.65 135.43 125.42 R 
r = 3 89.08 112.88 103.68 F 82.27 104.36 95.51 F 
Note: The testing for the higher order rank is stopped at the first time when we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis. The corresponding critical values are taken from CATS in RATS, Volume 2 manual by Dennis 
(2006). See Table C.2 for Critical value* and Table C.3 for Critical Value. R and F stand for “reject the 
null hypothesis” and “fail to reject the null hypothesis”, respectively. 
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